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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The uncertain nature of our economic realm makes economic modeling a difficult
exercise. There is hardly a situation where decisions are made with perfect infor-
mation, therefore developing tools that can be used to model uncertainty is critical
for both positive analysis (where the aim is at understanding human behavior), and
normative analysis (where the aim is at making policy recommendations). In addi-
tion, recent developments in computing have led to the emergence of computationally
intensive methods of analysis that provide the economic modeler with a greater free-
dom in addressing complex problems that were previously intractable. The goal of
this dissertation is to model economic agents’ behavior by considering the signifi-
cance of uncertainty in decision making, and by putting into context the importance
of Bayesian MCMC methods in expanding modeling possibilities. To this end, three
essays are considered with emphasis on risk in scientific productivity, rationality and
health insurance choice.
The first essay shows how risk affects the productivity of untenured faculty re-
searchers. Junior faculty members under the tenure system are appointed on the
basis of up-or-out contracts, requiring the faculty member to comply to vaguely spec-
ified departmental criteria. Failure to reach this standard leads to the loss of a job
and its corresponding wage. On the basis of both, uncertainty in monetary value of
publication (which is a price uncertainty) and publication uncertainty (which is an
output uncertainty), a faculty member’s output decision is modeled through the ex-
pected utility paradigm (VonNeumann and Morgenstern, 1944). This essay extends
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the analysis of Chen and Lee (2009), by looking at ex-ante incentive properties of
tenure from the perspective of a junior faculty member, rather than a department as
accustomed in the principal-agent framework. The results suggest that risk signifi-
cantly affect faculty output decisions.
It was shown that a risk averse faculty member in the presence of publication value
uncertainty, publishes at a point where the expected value of publication exceeds
its marginal cost. Also a faculty member’s scientific productivity was shown to be
stimulated by increases in base salary when decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)
described the faculty member’s preference, while increased uncertainty in the value
of publication provided a lesser incentive for scientific research output production.
Moreover, when publication decision can be targeted at different journals, risk averse
faculty had the economic incentive to target journals with negatively correlated per-
unit returns.
In terms of academic field-wide effects, risk was shown to affect the distribution
of faculty across journal tiers with the few most able faculty targeting publications
at top-tier journals and most of the faculty community concentrated in the rela-
tively lower tiers. This has implications for the observed increase in the volume of
uncited published papers, which Mohamed (2004) suggested was due to the growing
publish-or-perish emphasis of many academic institutions. This emphasis seems to
have shifted faculty priorities away from risky quality publications in top-tier journals
and toward relatively sure quantity publication in low-tier journals. Because top-tier
journals are the ones more widely read and cited, this leaves a mass of uncited papers
in low-tier publication outlets. Furthermore, risk was shown to affect faculty dis-
tribution across differently ranked academic departments, guaranteeing then viable
matching between departments and faculty through its effect on faculty self selection
mechanism. The most able faculty were shown to self select into top-ranked depart-
ments with high quality publication standards, while the less able faculty self selected
2
into relatively lower ranked departments.
The second essay tests for the appropriateness of the rationality assumption in
adults health insurance choice in the U.S., using the 2007 MEPS dataset. The ques-
tion this essay attempts to answer is : given the sample evidence from the MEPS, is
it reasonable to assume that adults in the U.S. behave rationally in their choices of
health insurance? The rationality test is achieved here by looking at the consistency
between respondents’ stated preferences for health insurance in earlier rounds of the
MEPS with their revealed health insurance choices at the end of the survey. The
underlying assumption is that if agents are rational in their choices, then on average,
we should observe some degree of consistency between stated preferences and revealed
preferences for health insurance, accordingly with rational theory predictions. In fact,
the results suggest rationality is appropriate in this context, therefore allowing one
to use the discrete choice modeling framework to investigate health insurance choices
by U.S. adults.
The evidence from the econometric estimation supports the two hypotheses. This
implies consistency with the presented economic model’s predictions in section 2 of the
essay, and further suggests that the rationality assumption as a guiding mechanism
for the 2007 MEPS data generating process, in the context of health insurance choice,
is reasonable.
In addition to providing an answer to the intended question of interest, the study
produces results that are consistent with the past literature, with respect to individ-
uals’ satisfaction (or optimism) toward health insurance consumption. The results in
fact suggest relatively more skepticism (dissatisfaction) toward public only coverage
compared to having some private coverage. This is because the strength of unlikeli-
ness to seek health insurance for those that expressed health insurance to not be worth
its cost relative to being uncertain, is stronger for public only coverage compared to
having some private coverage.
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Finally, the third essay addresses the issue of health insurance preference endo-
geneity in adults’ health insurance enrollment decision in the U.S. within a Bayesian
multinomial probit framework. The research goal here is to be able to say for a set
of covariates, how the health insurance outcome probabilities vary based on differ-
ing health insurance preferences. The R package endogMNP (Burgette, 2010) is
used to fit the model, with appropriate convergence diagnostics suggesting accept-
able convergence of the chains. The sampler uses the marginalization principle of van
Dyk (2010), producing marginal posterior distributions that are easy to interpret.
For example we find that females are less likely than males to express “not-worthy”
compared to “uncertain” as their preference for health insurance, while more likely
than males to express “worthy” compared to “uncertain.” In addition, the effect of
college education on coverage through public only, is significant across all health in-
surance preference categories. Although this effect is almost similar for adults with
uncertain, and Not-worthy preferences which are 0.2234 and 0.2218 respectively, it
is relatively larger, 0.3681 for individuals with strong preference for health insurance
(worthy). These coefficient values suggest that regardless of insurance preference,
compared to adults with no college experience, those with at least one year of college
experience are more likely to be publicly covered only, over being uninsured. Also,
looking at the regional dummy variables, positive and significant coefficient values
across all preference categories suggest that relative to southerners, adults from the
Midwest are more likely to choose public coverage over being uninsured irrespective
of insurance preference. Similarly, relative to southerners, adults from the Northeast
are more likely to choose public coverage over being uninsured, however they only
do so when they have Uncertain, or Not-Worthy preferences. Finally, the coefficient
estimates for the health characteristics variables suggest that relative to having an
EXCELLENT health condition, adults with GOOD or VERY-GOOD health condi-
tions are more likely to have some private coverage, but only when their preference for
4
health insurance is “Not-Worthy.” However, individuals with FAIR or POOR health
conditions, relative to adults with EXCELLENT health condition, are more likely to
have some private coverage when they are more decisive in the expression of their
health insurance preference (worthy or Not-worthy).
5
CHAPTER 2
RISK AND JUNIOR FACULTY SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIVITY
INCENTIVES UNDER THE ACADEMIC TENURE SYSTEM
2.1 Introduction
Today more journals in a particular academic research field are published than anyone
can reasonably keep up with. As a consequence many articles, both print and elec-
tronic, remain without a single citation for several years. This situation, as suggested
by Mohamed (2004), is the mere result of the growing “publish-or-perish”emphasis
of many academic institutions. In fact with the “up-or-out” rules that come with
tenure-track appointment in institutions where scientific research output is the main
and objective measure for tenure and promotion decisions, the emphasis on publishing
introduces some degree of risk for faculty members and triggers behavioral response
in terms of scientific productivity.
Kou and Zhou (2009) suggested that a university, by offering up-or-out contracts
with probationary period and predetermined academic criterion, can ensure that pro-
fessors produce knowledge through research activities. Formally up-or-out contracts
are arrangements between a department and a faculty with the following features: (i)
the department commits to retain the faculty for a pre-specified period; (ii) the fac-
ulty is considered for promotion only at the end of the probationary period, subject
to satisfactory completion of some departmental criteria. If promoted, permanent
retention is granted, otherwise the faculty member is permanently fired. Therefore
the prospect of risk is prevalent during the probationary period junior faculty must
go through to achieve tenure.
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Freeman (1977) offers a risk-sharing explanation for the existence of the tenure
system. In his opinion, the combination of tenure system and minimum wage policy
is a risk-sharing mechanism encouraging risk-averse faculty to do risky but socially
beneficial research projects. For McKenzie (1996), academic tenure is intended to
guarantee the right to academic freedom, to allow original ideas to arise by giving
scholars the intellectual autonomy to investigate the issues about which they are
more passionate, and to report unbiased findings. While Carmichael (1988) argues
that tenure provides older faculty members with the needed security to select new
members of potentially greater ability, McKenzie (1996) on the other hand believes
that what incumbents are really seeking is protection from their colleagues in a work
environment operating under the rules of academic democracy, by increasing the costs
predatory faculty members must incur to be successful in having more productive
colleagues dismissed.
In more recent studies by Jing (2008) and Chen and Lee (2009), tenure-track
appointment is found to play the role of a screening device by screening out low pro-
ductivity faculty before tenure contract is signed. From the perspective of the junior
faculty member seeking tenure such screening is risky because the knowledge special-
ization required for scientific progress puts researchers at risk of being misunderstood,
and not rightly evaluated by other colleagues, especially in the short run (McPherson
and Winston (1983)). Whereas a normative stand is taken in other studies to justify
the existence of the tenure system, this paper takes a rather positive approach. Con-
sidering the fact that the tenure system is adopted by many academic institutions as
an internal policy across the U.S., Canada and some European countries, I investi-
gate the behavior of junior faculty prior to the tenure decision to see how sources of
uncertainty affect scientific research output decisions.
This analysis is a follow up to Chen and Lee (2009), who model the ex-ante
incentives produced by academic tenure under asymmetric information using a self-
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selection principal-agent model with unobservable type and action and examined the
incentives in different institutions. As a principal-agent model, their analysis is fo-
cused on the interest of the principal (academic institution/ department), rather than
that of the agent (faculty). Furthermore, none of the above referenced literature an-
alyzes the tenure system from the perspective of the faculty member seeking tenure.
Therefore in the current study I combine tools from the physics literature with mod-
eling tools from probability theory and the economics of risk to focus on the interest
of agents by analyzing ex-ante incentive properties of tenure from the perspective of
a junior faculty member seeking tenure.
The modeling strategy implemented in this paper is the first of its kind on the
topic. To this end, I start by first motivating risk under the academic tenure system
in section 2, and then describe a way to quantify faculty scientific research output in
section 3. In section 4, faculty publication decisions are analyzed in a single journal
setting, first under uncertainty in the monetary value of publication, with some com-
parative statics, then under publication uncertainty with a general setting, followed
by special cases. Section 5 extends the single journal setting to examine the impli-
cation of risk and risk aversion for faculty diversification strategies when publication
can be targeted at more than one journal. Section 6 considers academic field wide
implications of risk, while section 7 provides a discussion and model comparison, and
Finally section 8 concludes the analysis.
2.2 Motivating Risk Under The Academic Tenure System
Risk is found in any situation where an event is not known with certainty (Chavas,
2004, p. 5). By this definition prospects for risk are widespread since the occurrence
of any future event is almost always uncertain. In most academic institutions, where
publication has become an imperative endeavor for the survival and prosperity of
faculty members, the “up-or-out” rules that usually come with tenure-track appoint-
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ment in such institutions introduces risk because of the long probationary period and
faculty inability to fully control the publication process. Usually, a well established
senior scholar is offered a tenure position directly while a junior faculty with an un-
certain academic prospect has to experience a probationary period, by the end of
which, he will obtain tenure if he has met some academic criterion and will be fired
otherwise.
The prospect of being fired introduces an overall income uncertainty for the junior
faculty member. Therefore, consistent with the expected utility hypothesis by Von-
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), it is assumed that faculty make research output
decisions on the basis of the expected utility of this uncertain income. This overall
income uncertainty can be motivated by two sources of uncertainty: a price uncer-
tainty, and a quantity uncertainty. To see how, let I represent the junior faculty
member’s overall income, then it can be represented as the sum of a (nonrandom)
base salary w, and the (random) incremental income py from publishing y research
output each with monetary value p. Under such formulation, the income I = w + py
is also a random variable because of the randomness in the second term to the right
of the equality. Randomness in this second term has two possible sources. It can be
introduced through uncertainty in the monetary value of publication p, or through
uncertainty in the publication of scientific research output y. For this reason, the
analysis presented in this paper focuses on these two sources of tenure-track risk:
Uncertainty in the monetary value of publication and Publication uncertainty.
2.2.1 Uncertainty in the monetary value of publication
Because of the specialized and highly sophisticated nature of academic work, its valu-
ation is somewhat uncertain. According to McKenzie (1996) the benefits of scientific
research projects undertaken by faculty are uncertain and sometimes may not be
known for a long time. Moreover, the value may change with the passage of time,
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stressing the temporal dimension of risk. Therefore the use of probability theory as
a formal structure describing and representing risky events allows us to model the
monetary value of publication in this analysis as a random variable. For example, in
a study of faculty compensation, Broder and Ziemer (1982) found that an additional
American Journal of Agricultural Economics (AJAE) article published every other
year increases faculty salary by $735/ year. Therefore publication has a monetary
value attached to it, which as a random variable, implies that it can lead to different
outcomes.
2.2.2 Publication uncertainty
because scientific research output production is the main and objective measure con-
sidered for tenure promotion, any randomness in the publication process introduces
uncertainty in the final tenure outcome. In addition, the use of the h-index described
in the next section as a measure of scientific productivity shows how publication
uncertainty can affect faculty probability of getting tenure after the probationary
period. The h-index is computed using the number of publication and the number
of citations received by those publications, therefore the prospect of rejection from
publishers and the lack of control over research output citations introduce uncertainty
in the final tenure outcome. The randomness in the publication process is modeled
using a stochastic publication function in later sections.
2.3 Quantifying Faculty Scientific Research Output
The h-index as adapted in this chapter was introduced in the physics literature by
Hirsch (2005) as a useful index to characterize the scientific output of a researcher.
Because junior faculty have a limited amount of time to prove their competence as
researchers, this index allows for objective judgment of the impact and relevance of the
faculty research work by the end of the probation period. Letting the probationary
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period set by the department be n years, then junior faculty publication records
include among other things the number (Np) of papers published over the n years,
the number of citations (N jc ) for each paper (j), the journals where the papers were
published and the journal impact parameters. A junior faculty is said to have index
h if at the end of the probationary period, h of the faculty’s Np papers have at least
h citations each, and the other (Np − h) papers have no more than h citations each.
Hirsch (2005) argues that two faculty with similar number of total papers or total
citation count and very different h, the one with the higher h value is likely to be
a more accomplished researcher. Therefore the h index measures the broad impact
of the faculty’s work and avoids disadvantages of the other single-number criteria
commonly used to evaluate scientists research output such as: the total number of
papers (Np), the total number of citations(Nc,tot), citations per paper, number of
significant papers, etc.
To understand the h index, consider the case where faculty publishes p papers
every year, and each publication receives c citations per year every subsequent year.
The total number of citations when tenure decision is being made, that is at the
(n + 1)th year, is given by Nc,tot =
∑n
j=1 pcj =
pcn(n+1)
2
. If all papers up to year y
contribute to the index, then we have
(n− y)c = h
py = h
where the left hand sides of the above two equations represent respectively the number
of citations to the most recent of the papers contributing to h, and the total number
of papers contributing to h. Combining those two equations yields h = c
1+c/p
n ≈ m·n,
where m = c
1+c/p
.The total number of citations is approximately Nc,tot ≈ (1+c/p)22c/p ·h2 =
a · h2, where a = (1+c/p)2
2c/p
therefore, the total number of citations received during the
probationary period is proportional to the squared index value.
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The linear relationship between the index h and the probationary period n should
hold generally for junior faculty producing papers of similar quality at a steady rate
over the course of the probationary period, however the slope m will vary from faculty
to faculty, and so provides a useful measure for faculty comparison. This linear re-
lationship beaks down however when the researcher slows down in paper production
or stops publishing altogether. In such case a stretched exponential model may be
more realistic as suggested by Hirsch (2005). Since the current analysis focuses on
untenured risk averse faculty’s productivity, it is reasonable to assume that faculty
will not stop publishing during the probationary period, such that the linear relation-
ship between h and n holds as a realistic model. As suggested by Hirsch (2005), a
department may set a minimal value of h that a junior scholar must achieve by the
end of the probationary period to secure tenure.
2.4 Faculty Decisions Under A Single Journal Setting
2.4.1 Uncertainty in the monetary value of publication
First, the market for academic employment is assumed to be competitive, with fac-
ulty research output targeted at a single journal in one’s chosen field, such that
publications have the same but uncertain monetary value. In the publication pro-
cess, the faculty chooses the input vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)
′
, that include time, effort,
and other resources used in the production of scientific research output. Faculty re-
search output in terms of publications is denoted by y, and the publication technology
represented by the function y = f(x). The publication function f(x) measures the
largest feasible research output the faculty can obtain by committing the input vec-
tor x = (x1, . . . , xn)
′
. At this point, no uncertainty in the publication process (such
case will be investigated in latter sections) is assumed. At the time research project
decisions are made, the faculty tries to anticipate the uncertain monetary value she
will receive from publishing her research output. As such, faculty treats the mone-
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tary value of publication p as a random variable, with a given subjective probability
distribution.
Let v = (v1, . . . , vn)
′
denote the respective prices paid for the inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn)
′
.
Then the faculty cost of producing research output can be represented by v
′
x =∑n
i=1 vixi, and the uncertain income generated is py. it follows that faculty net mon-
etary benefit from publication can be represented by: τ = py − v′x. In addition,
letting w denotes the base salary or initial wealth, then faculty terminal wealth is:
w + py − v′x. Given that the monetary value of publication is uncertain, this termi-
nal wealth is also uncertain. Now assuming faculty behave in a way consistent with
expected utility model, then the objective function of the faculty is
E[U(w + py − v′x)] = E[U(w + τ)] (2.1)
where the E is the expectation operator based on the subjective probability distri-
bution of the random variable p. It’s assumed that faculty have risk-averse prefer-
ences represented by the utility function U(·) which satisfies U ′ ≡ ∂U/∂w > 0 and
U
′′ ≡ ∂2U/∂w2 < 0. To see how the utility function U(·) summarizes all risk infor-
mation relevant to faculty decisions, consider the following assumptions about faculty
preferences among risky prospects b1 and b2 where,
b1 ∼∗ b2 implies indifference between b1 and b2
b1 ≥∗ b2 implies that b2 is not preferred to b1
b1 >
∗ b2 implies that b1 is preferred to b2
Assumption A1 (ordering and transitivity)
• For any random variables b1 and b2, exactly one of the following must hold:
b1 >
∗ b2, b2 >∗ b1 or b1 ∼∗ b2.
• If b1 ≥∗ b2 and b2 ≥∗ b3 then b1 ≥∗ b3. (transitivity)
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Assumption A2 (Independence)
For any random variables b1, b2, b3, and any α(0 < α < 1), then b1 ≤∗ b2 if and only
if
[αb1 + (1− α)b3] ≤∗ [αb2 + (1− α)b3].
(that is the preferences between b1 and b2 are independent of b3)
Assumption A3 (continuity)
For any random variables b1, b2, b3, where b1 <
∗ b3 <∗ b2, there exist numbers α and
β, (0 < α < 1), (0 < β < 1), such that b3 <
∗ [αb2+(1−α)b1] and b3 >∗ [βb2+(1−β)b1].
(that is sufficiently small change in probabilities will not reverse a strict preference)
Assumption A4
For any risky prospects b1, b2 satisfying Pr[b1 ≤ r : b1 ≤∗ r] = Pr[b2 ≥ r : b2 ≥∗ r] = 1
for some sure reward r, then b2 ≥∗ b1.
Assumption A5 (ordering and transitivity)
• For any number r, there exist two sequences of numbers α1 ≥∗ α2 ≥∗ . . . and
β1 ≤∗ β2 ≤∗ . . . satisfying αm ≤∗ r and r ≤∗ βn for some m and n.
• For any risky prospects b1 and b2, if there exists an integer mo such that [b1
conditional on b1 ≥ αm : b1 ≥∗ αm] ≥∗ b2 for every m ≥ mo, then b1 ≥∗ b2. And
if there exists an integer no such that [b1 conditional on b1 ≤ βn : b1 ≤∗ βn] ≤∗ b2
for every n ≥ no, then b1 ≤∗ b2.
Under assumptions A1-A5, for any risky prospects b1 and b2, by the expected utility
theorem, there exists a utility function U(b) representing faculty risk preferences such
that b1 ≥∗ b2 if and only if E[U(b1)] ≥∗ E[U(b2)], with U(b) defined up to a positive
linear transformation. See (DeGroot, 1970, p. 113-114) for a proof of the expected
utility theorem.
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Therefore, under the assumption A1-A5, the expected utility hypothesis provides
an accurate characterization of faculty behavior under risk in general, and so can be
used to model faculty response to risk during the probationary period in tenure-track
appointment.
Result 1. The definition of the utility function up to a positive linear transforma-
tion, implies that, if U(b) is a utility function for a particular faculty, then so is the
linear transformation Z(b) = α + βU(b) for any α and β > 0 scalars.
Proof. Starting from the equivalence between b1 ≥∗ b2 and E[U(b1)] ≥∗ E[U(b2)],
stated in the expected utility theorem, given β > 0, E[U(b1)] ≥∗ E[U(b2)] is equivalent
to α + βE[U(b1)] ≥ α + βE[U(b2)], which is also equivalent to E[Z(b1)] ≥ E[Z(b2)].
Therefore, b1 ≥∗ b2 if and only if E[Z(b1)] ≥ E[Z(b2)], implying that Z(·) and U(·)
provide equivalent representations of a faculty member’s risk preferences.
This characteristic further implies that without affecting a faculty member’s pref-
erence ranking, the utility function U(b) can be shifted by changing its intercept
and/or by multiplying its slope by a positive constant. this special feature will be
useful for our analysis.
Now, letting µ = E(p) be the expected monetary value of publication, then p can
be represented as p = µ + σe. Where e is a random variable with zero mean, and
introducing randomness in the monetary value of publication p. The random compo-
nent e can exhibit any distribution for which both the mean and the variance exist.
The standard deviation of the monetary value of publication, σ can be interpreted
as a mean-preserving spread parameter for the distribution of p. Therefore, in this
analysis, the probability distribution of p will be characterized by the mean µ and the
mean preserving spread parameter σ following the analysis of firm production under
uncertainty by Sandmo (1971).
Under the expected utility model, a faculty member’s publication decision can be
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represented by
Maxx,y{E[U(w + py − v′x) : y = f(x)]}. (2.2)
which states that publication decisions are made in a way consistent with expected
utility maximization
Faculty costs minimizing behavior
In the absence of publication uncertainty, expected utility maximization implies cost
minimization by faculty. Faculty will minimize the cost of the inputs used in the
publication process, which include the effort cost, the opportunity cost of time allo-
cated to research, and the costs of other used resources. To see that, note that the
maximization problem in equation (2.2) can be written as
Maxy{Maxx{E[U(w + py − v′x) : y = f(x)]}}
= Maxy{E[U(w + py +Maxx{− v′x : y = f(x)}]}
= Maxy{E[U
(
w + py −Minx{v′x : y = f(x)}
)
]}
= Maxy{E[U(w + py − C(v, y)]}. (2.3)
where C(v, y) = Minx{v
′
x : y = f(x)} is the publication cost function similar
to the cost function in standard production theory under certainty. Therefore, for
given input prices v, C(v, y) measures the smallest possible cost of producing research
output y. Where output here is measured in terms of publications. This shows that in
the absence of publication risk, risk averse junior faculty has the incentive to behave
in a cost minimizing fashion.
Equation (2.3) offers a convenient way of analyzing a junior faculty member’s
behavior, since it involves choosing only one variable: y, faculty scientific research
output. Now assuming that the scholar decides on positive research output, y > 0,
then using the chain rule, the first-order necessary condition associated with the
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optimal choice of y is given by:
F (y, ·) ≡ E[U ′ · (p− Cy)] = 0, (2.4)
or recalling from rules of probability theory that Cov(U
′
, p) = E(U
′ ·p)−E(U ′) ·E(p),
then E(U
′ · p) = E(U ′) · µ+ Cov(U ′ , p), and equation (2.4) can be rewritten as:
µ− Cy + Cov(U ′ , p)/EU ′ = 0 (2.5)
where Cy ≡ ∂C/∂y denotes the marginal cost of publication, U ′ ≡ ∂U/∂y, and
Cov(U
′
, p) = E(U
′
σe). The associated second order condition for a maximum is
D ≡ ∂F/∂y ≡ E[U ′ · (−Cyy)] + E[U ′′ · (p− Cy)2] < 0. (2.6)
Define R to be the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk premium, which shows the shadow
cost of private risk bearing by faculty. Then R is the monetary value satisfying the
indifference relationship {w+py−C(v, y)} ∼∗ {w+E(p) ·y−C(v, y)−R} and under
the expected utility model R is the solution of the equation:
E[U [w + py − C(v, y)]] = U [w + E(p) · y − C(v, y)−R] (2.7)
So, given that U [w+py−C(v, y)] is a strictly increasing function, its inverse always ex-
ists. Denoting the inverse by U−1, then it follows that U−1{E[U [w+py−C(v, y)]]} =
w + E(p) · y − C(v, y)−R, thus the risk premium can be written as
R(w, y, ·) = w + µ · y − C(v, y)− U−1{E[U [w + py − C(v, y)]]}. (2.8)
Maximizing the expected utility as shown in equation (2.3) is equivalent to maximiz-
ing “the certainty equivalent” w + µ · y − C(v, y) − R(w, y, ·). It follows then that
faculty publication decision can alternatively be written as:
Maxy[w + µ · y − C(v, y)−R(w, y, ·)], (2.9)
with the associated first-order condition given by
µ− Cy(v, y)−Ry(w, y, ·) = 0 (2.10)
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where Ry(w, y, ·) ≡ ∂R/∂y is the marginal risk premium. Comparing this result with
the first order condition in equation(2.5), it follows thatRy(w, y, ·) = −Cov(U ′ , p)/E(U ′),
providing an intuitive interpretation for the covariance term: [−Cov(U ′ , p)/E(U ′)] as
the marginal risk premium, measuring the marginal effect of scientific research output
production, on the implicit cost of private risk bearing by faculty.
The publication function
The publication function is the function y∗(w, µ, σ) satisfying the first-order condition
in equation (2.5), or in equation (2.10):
µ = Cy(v, y) +Ry(w, y, ·) (2.11)
The condition in equation (2.11) implies that, at the optimum research output publi-
cation y∗, the expected monetary value of publication µ is equal to the marginal cost
of publication Cy, plus the marginal risk premium Ry. This means that expressing
the sum (Cy + Ry) as a function of research output y gives the publication function,
and generates the schedule of scientific research output production by the risk-averse
faculty member, for each level of expected monetary value of publication µ.
Result 2. Under uncertainty in the monetary value of publication, and risk aversion,
a junior scholar publishes at a point where the expected monetary value of publication
µ exceeds the marginal cost of publication (Cy).
Proof. if ∂U
′
/∂p < 0(> 0), then U
′
and p move in the opposite(same) direction(s),
implying a negative (positive) covariance, therefore the covariance term Cov(U
′
, p) is
always of the sign of ∂U
′
/∂p. But sign[∂U
′
/∂p] = sign(U
′′ · y). Thus, risk aversion
(where U
′′
< 0) implies that Cov(U
′
, p) < 0. And it follows that the marginal risk
premium Ry = −Cov(U ′ , p)/E(U ′) > 0 under risk aversion, which in turn implies
that µ > Cy at the optimum.
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Figure 2.1: Publication function
The publication function is illustrated in figure (2.1) , and shows that under risk
aversion, risk can have significant effects on a faculty member’s resource allocation.
The analysis shows that, while risk does not involve any explicit cost to faculty, its
implicit cost (as measured by the marginal risk premium Ry) needs to be added to
the marginal cost of publication Cy in the evaluation of optimal publication decisions.
Comparative statics analysis
Since risk affects faculty scientific productivity under risk aversion, this effect is in-
vestigated in more detail by conducting a comparative static analysis of the research
output decision y in equation (2.4). Letting α = (w, µ, σ) be the vector of parameters
of the publication function y∗(α), then using the chain rule and total differentiating
the first-order condition F (y, α) = 0 at the optimum y = y∗(α) yields
∂F/∂α + (∂F/∂y)(∂y∗/∂α) = 0,
or, with D = ∂F/∂y < 0, (from equation (2.6))
∂y∗/∂α = −D−1∂F/∂α
= −D−1∂{E[U ′ · (p− Cy)]}/∂α
= sign(∂{E[U
′ · (p− Cy)]}/∂α).
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this result is used to analyze the properties of the publication function y∗(α),
looking at changes in the elements of the parameter vector α = (w, µ, σ).
4.1.3(a) The effect of a change in base salary, w
The effect of changing faculty base Salary (initial wealth) w is given by
∂y∗/∂w = −D−1{∂{E[U ′ · (p− Cy)]}/∂w} = −D−1{E[U ′′ · (p− Cy)]}. (2.12)
Assuming faculty preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), then
the term E[U
′′ · (p − Cy)] > 0. To see that, consider the Arrow-Pratt absolute
risk aversion coefficient r = −U ′′/U ′ , and any risky return b then the result R ≈
−0.5(U ′′/U ′) · V ar(b) by (Chavas, 2004, p. 36-37) provides a link between the risk
premium R and the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion r = −U ′′/U ′ .
Because var(b) > 0 for all b non degenerate, the sign of the risk premium R always
is the same as that of r, and so for risk averse faculty (R > 0), the corresponding
r = −U ′′/U ′ > 0. Therefore, letting τo denote the net benefit from publication τ ,
when evaluated at p = Cy, then under DARA,
r(τ)
<
> r(τo) if p
>
< Cy,
it follows that
−U ′′/U ′ <> r(τo) for p
<
> Cy,
or U
′′ <
> −r(τo) · U ′ for (p− Cy)
>
< 0,
or U
′′ · (p− Cy) > −r(τo) · U ′ · (p− Cy),
and taking the expectation on both sides of the inequality yields
E[U
′′ · (p− Cy)] > −r(τo) · E[U ′ · (p− Cy)] = 0,
with the last equality on the RHS coming from the first order conditions in equation
(2.4). Therefore E[U
′′ · (p− Cy)] > 0 as required and ∂y∗/∂w > 0.
Result 3. Under uncertainty in the monetary value of publication, if DARA char-
acterizes faculty preferences, increasing a junior faculty member’s base salary w tends
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Figure 2.2: Effect of changing base salary w under DARA, with w1 > w0
to stimulate scientific research output production by decreasing the implicit cost of
private risk bearing. This occurs because under DARA, private wealth accumulation
and insurance motives are substitutes.
This result is illustrated in figure (2.2) and shows that, under DARA, increasing the
faculty member’s base salary w from w0 to w1 reduces the marginal risk premium
Ry(w). This is because under risk aversion and DARA, private wealth accumulation
reduces the risk premium R, which is accompanied by a reduction in the marginal
risk premium Ry(w), which further generates a shift to the right of the publication
function (Cy +Ry).
4.1.3(b) The effect of a change in the expected monetary value of publica-
tion µ
The effect of changing expected monetary value of publication µ is given by
∂y∗/∂µ = −D−1{∂{E[U ′ ·(p−Cy)]}/∂µ} = −D−1{E[U ′ +yE[U ′′ ·(p−Cy)]}. (2.13)
Now defining ∂yc/∂µ ≡ −D−1[E(U ′)] as the compensated expected monetary value
effect, and given that D < 0 (from the second-order condition in equation (2.6)), it
follows that ∂yc/∂µ > 0. This in turn implies that the “compensated” publication
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Figure 2.3: The effect of changing mean value of publication µ under DARA, with
µ1 > µ0
function is always upward sloping with respect to changes in the expected mone-
tary value of publication µ. Also, recalling from equation (2.12) that ∂y∗/∂w =
−D−1{E[U ′′ · (p− Cy)], then we have the following Slutsky equation:
∂y∗/∂µ = ∂yc/∂µ+ (∂y∗/∂w) · y∗, (2.14)
which suggests that the slope of the uncompensated monetary value of publication
∂y∗/∂µ is equal to that of the compensated monetary value ∂yc/∂µ , plus an income
effect (∂y∗/∂w) · y∗. Under DARA, it was shown in result 3 that (∂y∗/∂w) > 0,
therefore the income effect (∂y∗/∂w) ·y∗ is also positive. Given that the compensated
effect is ∂yc/∂µ > 0, from the Slutsky equation it follows that ∂y∗/∂µ > 0. This
implies that the publication function exhibits a positive slope with respect to the
uncompensated monetary value of publication.
Result 4. Under uncertainty in the monetary value of publication, if DARA char-
acterizes faculty preferences, then an increase in expected monetary value of scientific
research output stimulates a junior faculty member’s publication effort.
This result is illustrated in figure (2.3) and shows that under DARA increasing the
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expected monetary value of research output µ from µ0 to µ1 increases publications
y∗(µ1) > y∗(µ0), since the publication function is upward sloping under DARA. Also,
figure (2.3) suggests that the marginal cost Cy and the marginal risk premium Ry are
higher at µ1 compared to µ0.
4.1.3(c) The effect of a change in publication risk σ
The effect of changing the mean-preserving parameter value σ, which also represents
the risk in the monetary value of publication, is given as follows, with a standardized
value of sigma(σ = 1)
∂y∗/∂σ = −D−1{∂{E[U ′ · (p− Cy)]}/∂σ}, (2.15)
= −D−1{E(U ′ · e) + yE[U ′′ · (p− µ)(p− Cy)]},
= −D−1{E(U ′ · e) + yE[U ′′ · (p− Cy + Cy − µ)(p− Cy)]},
= −D−1{E(U ′ · e) + yE[U ′′ · (p− Cy)2] + y(Cy − µ)E[U ′′ · (p− Cy)]}.
But E(U
′ ·e) = Cov(U ′ , p), since p = µ+σe with E(e) = 0. In addition, Cov(U ′ , p) =
sign(U
′′
y) < 0 under risk aversion, and (U
′′
< 0) implies E[U
′′ · (p − Cy)2] < 0 .
Furthermore, it was shown in results (2) and (3) that under DARA, Cy − µ < 0 and
E[U
′′ · (p− Cy)] > 0. It follows then from equation (2.15), that ∂y∗/∂σ < 0, that is,
increasing publication value risk (σ), decreases optimal research output.
Result 5. Under risk aversion, if DARA characterizes junior faculty preferences,
for a given mean return to publication, an increase in publication value risk provides
a general disincentive to publish.
This result is illustrated in Figure (2.4), where increasing σ from σ0 to σ1, shifts the
publication function to the left. This increasing risk exposure increases the scholar’s
private risk bearing as measured by the risk premium R, and so increases the marginal
risk premium Ry. The publication function (Cy +Ry) increases such that for a given
value of publication, research output falls.
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Figure 2.4: The effect of changing publication value risk σ under DARA, with σ1 > σ0
2.4.2 Publication uncertainty
So far, the analysis has focused on faculty behavior under uncertainty in the monetary
value of publication alone. The sources of uncertainty are now extended by introduc-
ing the second source of tenure-track risk in the form of publication uncertainty, where
risk is introduced through faculty research output as well rather than just the value
of the output itself. This is motivated by the fact that while faculty have the power
to make choices over the inputs committed in the publication process, the outcome of
the process is beyond the faculty member’s control. To this end, a general setting of
such uncertainty, is considered, followed by special cases for practical considerations.
The general setting
Under general publication uncertainty, a junior faculty member’s research output is a
random variable at the time input choices are being made. The publication technology
can be represented by a stochastic publication function. A generic specification of
this function is y(x, e), where y is the research output, x is a vector of inputs, and e
is a random variable reflecting publication uncertainty.
The stochastic publication function y(x, e) provides the maximum possible re-
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search output that can be obtained when the input vector x is committed and the
random variable e is realized. The faculty member is assumed to have information
about publication uncertainty, information represented by a subjective probability
distribution of the random variable e.
Building on price uncertainty from the previous section, let p be the monetary
value of the faculty member’s research output, v, represent the prices of the inputs
used in the publication process, and w the base salary received by faculty. Then, the
income generated by the junior scholar’s publications is py(x, e), the cost of publi-
cation is v
′
x =
∑n
i=1 vixi,the net return from publication is τ = py(x, e) − v
′
x, and
faculty terminal income (wealth) is (w + τ).
Allowing for uncertainty in the monetary value of publication, then the faculty
member does not know either e or p at the time research input decisions are being
made. In such setting, the faculty member faces both price and publication risks and
so treats both e and p as random variables with a given subjective joint probability
distribution. Under the expected utility model, the junior faculty’s objective function
is to choose inputs (time, effort, and other resources used in the publication process)
so as to maximize expected utility of terminal income
Maxx{E[U(w + py(x, e)− v′x)]} (2.16)
where the expectation E is based on the joint subjective distribution of the random
variables (p, e). Using the chain rule, the first order necessary conditions for the
optimal choice of inputs is:
E[U
′ · (p∂y(x, e)/∂x− v)] = 0,
or
E[(p∂y(x, e)/∂x] = v − Cov[U ′ , p∂y(x, e)/∂x]/E(U ′),
or
E(p)E[∂y(x, e)/∂x]+Cov[p, ∂y(x, e)/∂x] = v−Cov[U ′ , p∂y(x, e)/∂x]/E(U ′). (2.17)
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As shown in equation (2.9), maximizing expected utility is equivalent to maximizing
the corresponding certainty equivalent. The certainty equivalent of faculty terminal
income (wealth) is w+E[py(x, e)]−v′x−R(x, ·), where R(x, ·) represents the Arrow-
Pratt risk premium as before. Therefore the maximization problem in equation (2.16),
can be rewritten as
Maxx{w + E[py(x, e)]− v′x−R(x, ·)}
with first-order conditions
∂E[py(x, e)]/∂x− v −Rx(x, ·) = 0,
or
∂E[py(x, e)]/∂x = v +Rx(x, ·). (2.18)
Rx(x, ·) ≡ ∂R(x, ·)/∂x represents the marginal risk premium. Comparing the first-
order conditions in equation (2.17) to equation (2.18) indicates that the marginal risk
premium takes the form: Rx(x, ·) = −Cov[U ′ , p∂y(x, e)/∂x]/E(U ′). This equality
allows us to characterize the covariance term −Cov[U ′ , p∂y(x, e)/∂x]/E(U ′) as the
marginal risk premium measuring the effects of the committed input vector x, on the
implicit cost of private risk bearing by the junior faculty member. It also shows that
at optimal input commitment by the junior faculty, the expected marginal value of
research output, ∂E[py(x, e)]/∂x, is equal to the per unit cost of committed input v
plus the marginal risk premium, Rx(x, ·).
In the general form of the stochastic publication function y(x, e), the marginal
risk premium can be either positive, negative, or zero. Whether a particular input
increases or decreases the implicit cost of risk faced by the faculty member is largely
an empirical matter. However, for risk-averse faculty, the risk premium R(x, ·) > 0
and so when the marginal risk premium Rxi(x, ·) > 0, a faculty member will have an
incentive to reduce the use of the i-th input because this input increases the implicit
cost of risk bearing.
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For example when the i-th input is “effort” exerted in the research process, then
a positive marginal risk premium Rxi(x, ·) > 0 provides the junior scholar with the
incentive to reduce such“effort.” Conversely when Rxi(x, ·) < 0, the i-th input reduces
the implicit cost of risk, and so gives the junior faculty member the incentive to
increase the use of this input in the publication process. For example, if the i-th
input is “time,” then Rxi(x, ·) < 0, gives the junior scholar the incentive to put more
time in the research activity. For empirical tractability, possible specifications of the
general form of the publication function y(x, e) are now considered.
The stochastic publication function
There are two specifications of the stochastic publication function considered: one
proposed by Just and Pope (1978, 1979) and a moment base approach based on
Antle (1983).
Just-Pope specification: Just and Pope (1978, 1979) propose flexible specifica-
tions of stochastic production functions in general. Because of the parallelism between
the publication function developed in this paper and the standard stochastic produc-
tion function, a similar specification is adopted for the stochastic publication function,
which can be represented as:
y(x, e) = f(x) + e[h(x)]1/2, (2.19)
where E(e) = 0 and V ar(e) > 0. This specification of the publication function implies
that E(y) = f(x) and ∂E(y)/∂x = ∂f(x)/∂x, and that V ar(y) = V ar(e)h(x) with
∂V ar(y)/∂x = V ar(e) · ∂h(x)/∂x. Since the var(e) > 0, the sign of ∂V ar(y)/∂x
depends on that of ∂h(x)/∂x.
The publication function as specified can be interpreted as a regression model
exhibiting heteroskedasticity, where the interest is on identifying the effects of faculty
inputs decision on the variance V ar(y) of the research output produced. A higher
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research output variance effect implies a riskier input choice. In this Just-Pope like
specification of the publication function, depending on the functional form of h(x), the
marginal risk premium ∂h(x)/∂x can be negative, positive, or zero. And so, inputs
used in the publication process will be identified as risk reducing, risk increasing, or
risk neutral. In situations where the inputs affect publication risk, ∂h(x)/∂x 6= 0,
faculty can manage risk exposure through judicious choice of inputs. Under risk
aversion, where R(x, ·) > 0, faculty have an incentive to use inputs which reduce risk
exposure and its implicit cost and for which ∂h(x)/∂x < 0. In such setting, risk has
a direct impact on faculty input allocation and thus publication decisions.
Moment based approach: A moment based approach, which includes the Just-
Pope specification as a special case, is adapted from Antle (1983). The Just-Pope
specification, also referred to as mean-variance specification, is based on only the first
two moments of the distribution of the stochastic publication function and as such is
a special case of the more general moment based approach. The moment based ap-
proach allows for the empirical exploration of the role of higher-order moments, and
can capture more interesting features of the stochastic publication function. Consid-
ering the stochastic publication function in its generic form y(x, e), then the moment
generating function(MGF) of the random research output y if it exists is given by
My(t) = E(exp(ty)). The r-th derivative of the MGF evaluated at t = 0 gives the
r-th moment about the origin
M rY (0) = E(Y
r) ∀ r = 1, 2, . . .
from which the first central moment, the mean of the publication function given the
committed input vector x, is obtained by setting r=1. Let the mean be denoted as
µ(x) = E[y(x, e)],
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then the r-th moment about the mean of the stochastic publication function is given
by
Mr(x) = E{[y(x, e)− µ(x)]r} ∀ r = 2, 3, . . . (2.20)
From equation (2.20) we have M2(x) = V ar(x) , M3(x), and M4(x) respectively as
the conditional variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the faculty member’s stochastic
publication function.
The skewness M3(x) for example, provides a measure of symmetry of the distribu-
tion and so can be adjusted to accommodate various forms of risk aversion. To make
this approach empirically tractable, the following two specifications can be used:
y = µ(x) + u ∀ r = 1 (2.21)
from which [y− µ(x)] = u. Raising both sides of the equality to the r-th power gives
the second specification as
[y − µ(x)]r ≡ ur = Mr(x) + vr, ∀ r = 2, 3, . . . (2.22)
where E(u) = E(vr) = 0 and V ar(u) = M2(x) while
V ar(vr) ≡ E[ur −Mr]2 = E(u2r) +M2r − 2E(ur)Mr = M2r −M2r .
As specified, equations (2.21) and (2.22) are standard regression models that can be
implemented in a non-parametric or semi-parametric estimation framework. One can
also specify a parametric form for µ(x) and Mr(x) and use generalized method of
moments estimation(GMM), weighted least squares (WLS), or ordinary least squares
with heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator (OLS with HCCME)
for estimation. All these are consistent while accounting for the non-constant variance
(heteroskedasticity).
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2.5 Faculty Decisions Under Multiple Journal Setting
The analysis of faculty publication decisions focused only on a single journal setting,
allowing for the specification of a homogeneous research output with a unique but
uncertain value. Now, the publication decision is allowed to be targeted at more than
one journal, to account for publication diversification strategies that faculty might
develop in order to reduce risk. To this end, consider faculty producing research
output targeted at m different journals. Let y = (y1, . . . , ym)
′
be the publication
vector with corresponding monetary value p = (p1, . . . , pm)
′
. Under uncertainty in
the monetary value of publication, due to publication lags, the monetary value of
research output is not known at the time research decisions are being made. Let the
random monetary value of publication be given by pi = µi+σiei, with E(ei) = 0 for i =
1, . . .m. Then under the expected utility model, a faculty member’s risk preferences
can be represented by the utility function U(w+p
′
y−C(v, y)), where w is the faculty
member’s base salary; p
′
y =
∑m
i=1 piyi is the income generated from publications; and
C(v, y) is the faculty member’s cost of producing research output. Therefore, faculty
publication decision are made in a way consistent with the maximization problem
Maxy[EU(w + p
′
y − C(v, y)],
where the expectation operator E is over the subjective probability distribution of
the random vector p. Let y∗ denote the optimal research output, the properties of
y∗ derived under the single journal setting are difficult to obtain here. The reason
is that they now depend on both the joint probability distribution of the vector
p = (p1, . . . , pm)
′
and on the multidimensional stochastic publication technology.
Since such effects are difficult to predict in general, attention is focused on the slightly
less general specification, in the form of the mean-variance model.
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2.5.1 A mean-variance analysis
Consider a faculty member producing research output targeted atm different journals,
with y = (y1, . . . , ym)
′
representing the publication vector. Because each research
output yi has its corresponding monetary value pi and cost vi in terms of inputs used,
the net return per unit from publishing in the i-th journal is p˙i = pi − vi, such that
the vector of net return per unit of publication is p˙ = (p˙1, . . . , p˙m)
′
. A junior faculty
member’s net monetary benefit from publication is then given by τ = p˙
′
y =
∑m
i=1 p˙iyi.
Because of the uncertainty in the monetary value of publication p, the net returns per
unit of publications p˙i = pi − vi is also random. Denote the mean vector of the later
random vector by µ = (µ1 , . . . , µm)
′
= E(p˙) and the variance of p˙ by the (m ×m)
positive semi-definite matrix A shown below. The σii = V ar(p˙i) and σij = V ar(p˙i, p˙j)
represent respectively the variance of p˙i and the covariance between p˙i and p˙j, with
i, j = 1, . . . ,m.
A = V ar(p˙) =

σ11 σ11 . . . σ1m
σ12 σ22 . . . σ2m
...
...
. . .
...
σ1m σ2m . . . σmm

.
In the mean variance framework, the faculty member’s objective function is rep-
resented by the utility function U [E(τ), V ar(τ)], where E(τ) = E(p˙
′ · y) = µ′y =∑m
i=1 µiyi and V ar(τ) = y
′
Ay =
∑m
i=1
∑m
j=1(yiyjσij), such that research output deci-
sions are consistent with the maximization problem
Maxy{U [E(τ), V ar(τ)] : τ = p˙
′
y, y ∈ Y }.
or
Maxy{U [µ
′
y, y
′
Ay] : y ∈ Y }. (2.23)
Y represents the feasible set for the research output vector y. Since the junior
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scholar is assumed to be risk averse, ∂U/∂E(τ) > 0 and ∂U/∂V ar(τ) < 0. That
is the faculty member’s utility is increasing in the mean net monetary benefit from
publication, while decreasing in the variance of the monetary value. Letting y∗ denote
the junior scholar’s optimal research output choices, the properties of y∗ are now
investigated using the expected value-variance frontier paradigm.
The E-V frontier
An optimal allocation of resources across risky alternatives was considered by Markowitz
(1952) whose solution was to find the set of allocations that maximize expected total
return for different levels of the variance of total return. This is called the “expected
value-variance efficient” set or E-V frontier. The E-V frontier allows for the decom-
position of the mean-variance problem into two stages:
stage 1: This stage considers a junior faculty member’s choice of research output y
holding the expected return from publication E(τ) = µ
′
y constant at some level L:
Z(L) = Miny[y
′
Ay : µ
′
y = L, y ∈ Y ]. (2.24)
The indirect objective function is Z(L) = y+(L)
′
Ay+(L), provides the smallest possi-
ble variance attainable for given levels of expected publication return L, where y+(L)
represents the solution to the optimization problem in equation (2.24) for given lev-
els of expected return from publication L. The indirect objective function Z(L) is
called the “expected value-variance” (E-V) frontier and is the boundary of the feasible
region in the mean-variance space.
Under risk aversion, a faculty member’s utility maximizing behavior always implies
the choice of a point on the E-V frontier. Risk aversion implies that ∂U/∂V ar(τ) < 0,
therefore, for any given expected publication return L, a faculty member would always
prefer a reduction in return variability up to a point on the E-V frontier. Figure (2.5)
illustrates this and shows that a point like A is feasible but generates a high return
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Figure 2.5: The E-V frontier
variance. Therefore holding expected publication return constant, from point A, a
feasible reduction in return variability is always possible and improves the risk-averse
faculty member’s welfare.
A faculty member obtains the largest feasible return variability reduction by mov-
ing from point A to point B, which is located on the E-V frontier. Alternatively,
considering the choice of expected monetary return from publication for a given risk
exposure, with ∂U/∂V ar(τ) > 0, a risk-averse faculty member will always choose a
higher mean return up to a point on the E-V frontier. This is also shown in Figure
(2.5), where the junior scholar can improve his/her welfare by moving from point C,
which has a low expected publication return, to point B on the E-V frontier.
Stage 2 : This stage considers choosing the optimal value for L, the expected publi-
cation return, which is fixed in the first stage. Consider the following optimization
problem:
MaxLU(L,Z(L)) (2.25)
Let L∗ be the solution, then under differentiability and using the envelope theorem
the first-order necessary condition is
∂U/∂L+ (∂U/∂Z)(∂Z/∂L) = 0,
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Figure 2.6: The E-V frontier with indifference curve
or
(∂Z/∂L) = −(∂U/∂L)/(∂U/∂Z).
Differentiating equation (2.25) with respect to the expected publication return L,
gives the first order condition. It shows that, at the optimum, the slope of the E-
V frontier, ∂Z/∂µ, is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between mean and
variance of expected return to publication, −(∂U/∂L)/(∂U/∂Z). This marginal rate
of substitution is also the slope of the indifference curve between mean and variance
of publication return.
Figure (2.6) illustrates this and shows that putting stage 1 and stage 2 together
is always consistent with the original utility maximization problem, since y+(L) cor-
responds to the point on the E-V frontier where expected monetary return from
publication is equal to L. This leads to the following result:
Result 6. Under the mean-variance analysis, with uncertainty in the monetary
value of publication, when faculty can publish in more than one journal, a faculty
member’s optimal research output choice, y∗, is always the point on the E-V frontier
corresponding to the optimal expected return from publication L∗.
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Diversification
The mean-variance model also provides useful insights into faculty diversification
strategies. To illustrate how, consider the simple case of m = 2 journals. In such
case, y = (y1, y2) is the vector of faculty research output, p˙i represents the net return
per unit of publication in the i-th journal, with i = 1, 2. Then, τ = p˙1y1 + p˙2y2 is the
net monetary benefit from publication. Let the mean return from the i-th journal be
µi = E(p˙i) and its corresponding variance be σ
2
i = V ar(p˙i). The correlation coefficient
between the returns p˙1 and p˙2 can be represented by ρ with −1 ≤ ρ ≤ +1. Therefore,
the mean and variance of the expected net monetary return from publication are
given respectively by
E(τ) = µ1y1 + µ2y2
and
V ar(τ) = σ21y
2
1 + σ
2
2y
2
2 + 2ρσ1σ2y1y2.
The stage-one optimization is of the form:
Z(L) = Miny[σ
2
1y
2
1 + σ
2
2y
2
2 + 2ρσ1σ2y1y2 : µ1y1 + µ2y2 = L, y ∈ Y ]
or
Z(L) = Miny[σ
2
1y
2
1 + σ
2
2(L− µ1y1)2/(µ2)2 + 2ρσ1σ2y1(L− µ1y1)/µ2 : y ∈ Y ]. (2.26)
First, consider the extreme case where there is perfect positive correlation between
the returns p˙1 and p˙2. With ρ = +1, equation (2.26) can be rewritten as
Z(L) = Miny[(σ1y1 + σ2(L− µ1y1)/µ2)2 : y ∈ Y ] (2.27)
which implies that [V ar(τ)]
1
2 = σ1y1 +σ2(L−µ1y1)/µ2; the standard deviation of the
net monetary benefit τ from publication is a linear function of the publications in the
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Figure 2.7: Faculty risk diversification
first journal y1 and provides no possibility for diversification to reduce the variance
of publication return.
The second extreme case is obtained when ρ = −1, suggesting a perfect negative
correlation between the per unit returns from publication. Similarly, equation (2.26)
can be rewritten as:
Z(L) = Miny[(σ1y1 − σ2(L− µ1y1)/µ2)2 : y ∈ Y ] (2.28)
Choosing y1 = Lσ2/(µ2σ1 + µ1σ2) implies V ar(τ) = 0, which means that there is
a strategy that eliminates risk altogether. This suggest that ρ = −1 provides the
greatest possibility to reduce risk exposure. Faculty in this case can better diversify
by choosing two journals with opposite returns potential (for example one with a very
high return potential and the other one with a relatively low return potential).
Now, consider the intermediate cases with −1 < ρ < +1, where the possibilities of
diversification and risk reduction decrease with the correlation coefficient ρ between
the two returns p˙1, and p˙2. This is illustrated in figure (2.7) which shows the trade
off between expected net return to publication and the standard deviation of the
net return under alternative correlation coefficients. This figure further suggests that
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diversification strategies cannot help a faculty member reduce risk exposure as much
when the targeted journals have a strong positive correlation in their per unit return.
In such situation, a faculty member’s least risky strategy will be to target the journal
with the least risk exposure. On the other hand, risk exposure can be greatly reduced,
when faculty can target publications at journals with negative correlation in their per
unit returns to publication.
Result 7. Under the mean-variance analysis, with uncertainty in the monetary
value of publication,when faculty can diversify, then risk and risk aversion provide
economic incentives for a faculty member to target journals that are negatively cor-
related in their per unit returns.
This result suggests that although a faculty member will target journals with po-
tentially higher returns, i.e., the top tier journals in one’s field, the faculty member
will also consider publications in journals with a lower potential return. This is be-
cause acceptances in higher tier publications are constrained by the faculty member’s
ability to meet higher quality standards. Therefore a risk-averse faculty member may
find it strategic to target lower ranked journals to increase publication numbers which
increases the chances of a favorable tenure decision.
2.6 Field-Wide Implications Of Risk
2.6.1 Faculty distribution across journal tiers
In order to understand the implications of risk for the distribution of publications
across journal tiers, assume that the m potential journals that the scholar can target
publication at in a given field are ranked by level of riskiness from the most risky to
the least risky, say (J1, . . . Jm), with the top tier journals being the most risky and low
tier journals the least. Then, the faculty member’s problem can now be considered as
that of publishing in a given tier, since differently ranked journals provide different
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publication returns with higher level publications providing the greatest return.
Under such a setting, then faculty tend to target publications at journal tiers that
offer the greatest reward. The existence of different publication tiers at which faculty
can target publication, parallels that of the alternative occupations in Roy (1951)
and makes the results of the publisher’s self-selection process more varied, but with
more generalizations. Top tier publications will be more infrequent and carry greater
risk, while low tier publications occur more often and carry lower risk. Everyone in
the faculty community is assumed to be capable of publishing papers in either tier,
though the probability of publishing at the highest level may be near zero for some.
Whatever the returns from publications and the correlation ρ between returns from
each pair of outlets, top tier journals will always attract the most able faculty, and
virtually none of those less endowed. As shown in equation (2.27) and equation (2.28),
with perfectly negative correlation, or perfectly positive but small correlation between
pairs of returns from tiers publications, every tier will attract a high proportion of the
most able faculty and the proportion will decrease as less and less able faculty, in so
far as that particular tier is concerned, are considered. in the intermediate tiers, the
proportion of faculty of different levels of competence will not increase or decrease as
steadily with competence, as is the case in top and lower tier, but over some ranges
of potential research output, the proportion of faculty will rise and over others it will
fall. The general effect is a high variance in the distribution of faculty with ability to
publish in top-tier journals (top-tier publishers) within the field and a relatively more
concentrated distribution for faculty with ability to publish in relatively lower-tier
journals (low-tier publishers).
2.6.2 Faculty distribution across departments
The distribution of faculty across departments having different rankings will closely
follow that of the distribution of members across journal tiers. This is because differ-
38
ently ranked department will have different standards of publication requirements for
tenure. Top ranked departments will tend to require publications from top tier jour-
nals, while a relatively lower ranked department will have lower publication standards.
In such situations, faculty self-selection mechanism as described above will guarantee
that faculty with ability to publish in top-tier journals self select into top ranked de-
partments, while faculty with relatively lower-tier publication ability self select into
relatively lower ranked departments. Therefore risk operates to ensure compatible
faculty/department matching. That is, risk as introduced by the up-or-out rules
from tenure-track contracts, sufficiently guarantee a viable matching between faculty
and department. This is because risk averse faculty with knowledge of their personal
ability self-select into departments where the requirements for promotion (in terms of
publication standards) are such that faculty have a fair chance of getting tenure after
the probationary period. “Fair chance” is used to signify the fact that tenure is still
uncertain and contingent on the faculty member’s scientific research output meeting
departmental standards.
2.7 Discussion and Model Comparison
In relation to the principal agent modeling framework under information asymmetry,
this paper’s results in terms of faculty ex-ante behavior under the tenure system are
consistent with those of Jing (2008); Chen and Lee (2009). Tenure track contracts
with up-or-out rules significantly distorts junior faculty productivity incentives but
also allow for viable matching between department and faculty. A distinction how-
ever needs to be made between the two results. In this analysis, although informa-
tion about faculty ability is not known to the department/university, a department
through its ranking and publication quality standards, indirectly send information
about tenure requirements. Such information is taken into account by risk averse
junior faculty when looking for matching departments.
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In the principal agent model, tenure track as a labor market contract, acts as
a screening device providing department with information on faculty ability, and so
helps reduce the information rent for department, and as such tenure track only op-
erates after tenure-track contract is signed. In the current analysis however, tenure
track with up-or-out rules regulates the self-selection mechanism of faculty into de-
partments, long before the tenure track contract is signed, by affecting faculty decision
on which departments to seek tenure track contracts from, based on faculty subjec-
tively perceived probability of survival in such departments. Once a choice is made
and tenure-track contract is obtained then tenure-track rules continue to operate af-
fecting faculty scientific productivity incentives. Furthermore our analysis suggests
that the information gain as suggested by principle-agent models may not be quite
as much on the individual faculty member’s type relative to the whole faculty com-
munity in the field, but only on whether faculty is willing and able to respond to the
incentives provided in order to keep the position within the department by the end
of the probationary period.
2.8 Conclusion
The growing emphasis on publication as a requirement for tenure has modified junior
faculty members’ scientific productivity incentives by raising the uncertainty level
faced by untenured faculty. This paper has attempted to describe the effect of such
risk on junior faculty scientific research output decisions and the implications of risk
in terms of not only faculty distribution across publication tiers, but also across
differently ranked academic departments. It was shown that a risk averse faculty
member in the presence of publication value uncertainty, publishes at a point where
the expected value of publication exceeds its marginal cost. Also a faculty member’s
scientific productivity was shown to be stimulated by increases in base salary when
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) described the faculty member’s preference,
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while increased uncertainty in the value of publication provided a lesser incentive for
scientific research output production. Moreover, when publication decision can be
targeted at different journals, risk averse faculty had the economic incentive to target
journals with negatively correlated per-unit returns.
In terms of academic field wide effects, risk was shown to affect the distribution
of faculty across journal tiers with the few most able faculty targeting publications
at top-tier journals and most of the faculty community concentrated in the rela-
tively lower tiers. This has implications for the observed increase in the volume of
uncited published papers, which Mohamed (2004) suggested was due to the growing
publish-or-perish emphasis of many academic institutions. This emphasis seems to
have shifted faculty priorities away from risky quality publications in top-tier journals
and toward relatively sure quantity publication in low-tier journals. Because top-tier
journals are the ones more widely read and cited, this leaves a mass of uncited papers
in low-tier publication outlets. Furthermore, risk was shown to affect faculty dis-
tribution across differently ranked academic departments, guaranteeing then viable
matching between departments and faculty through its effect on faculty self selection
mechanism. The most able faculty were shown to self select into top-ranked depart-
ments with high quality publication standards, while the less able faculty self selected
into relatively lower ranked departments.
Finally, it must be emphasized that this analysis was purely positive and intended
to describe the effect of risk on junior faculty publication decisions, as faculty them-
selves perceive it. Nevertheless, a fairly detailed examination of this sort seems worth
while to illuminate such a familiar and commonplace phenomena from a rather differ-
ent angle, using already established tools from probability theory and the economics
of risk.
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CHAPTER 3
TESTING FOR RATIONALITY IN HEALTH INSURANCE CHOICE
BY ADULTS IN THE U.S.: A PANEL-LIKE ERROR COMPONENTS
MIXED LOGIT APPROACH
3.1 Introduction
Rational choice theory stipulates that individuals act as if balancing costs against
benefits to arrive at actions that maximize personal well being. As such, patterns of
behavior in society reflect the choices made by individuals as they try to maximize
benefits and minimize costs. In economic decision making, a rational agent is one
that has full information, and acts only if the marginal benefits of the action exceed
its marginal costs. Economic models relying on rational choice theory often adopt
the assumption that economic situations or collective behaviors are the result of
individual actions alone, as they choose the best action according to unchanging and
stable preference functions and constraints facing them.
This theoretical vision of rational choice theory has been subject to increasing crit-
icism in the literature because of its failure to account for certain types of behavioral
patterns expressed by individuals (Fernandez-Huerga, 2008; Schram and Caterino,
2006). These criticism have led to the development of the concept of bounded ratio-
nality, which explicitly recognizes the limited nature of information and the difficul-
ties people have in processing information. Although viewed as limited, the rational
choice approach remains an important paradigm because, assuming humans make
decisions in a rational, rather than stochastic manner, implies that their behavior
can be modeled; which further implies that predictions can be made about future
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actions. In addition, the mathematical formality of rational choice theory models
allow economists and other social scientists to derive results from their models that
may have otherwise not been observed, and to submit these theoretical results for
empirical scrutiny.
In fact, the aim of this paper is to test the rational choice paradigm in relation to
discrete choice modeling using a comparative statics result from an adapted version
of the static economic model of health investments and health outcomes by Strauss
and Thomas (2007, pp.3380-3385), which relies on the assumption that economic
agents behave rationally in their choice of health inputs. Therefore, focusing on
health insurance as a health input, two hypotheses are formulated from the model
and tested using data from the 2007 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The
question this paper attempts to answer is:
Given the sample evidence from the 2007 MEPS, are individual adults in
the U.S. rational in how they make their health insurance choices?
The MEPS is a nationally representative sample of the U.S. adult population that
allows us to test for the adequacy of the rationality assumption in the context of
health insurance choice. A respondent initially states her/his preference for health
insurance by expressing her/his attitude towards health insurance cost worthiness
as “uncertain” or “worthy” or “not worthy” in the Self Administered Questionnaire
(SAQ) of the MEPS. In the last round, the actual revealed health insurance status by
the individual over the scope of the panel is recorded as either “uninsured,” “private”
or “public.” The idea is that if rationality holds, then on average, agents’ revealed
preferences for health insurance will be consistent with their stated preferences.
Therefore, it is assumed that the 2007 MEPS sample is generated through the
optimizing behavior of rational agents or, in other words that rationality is the guiding
mechanism for the data generating process. If so the stated attitude toward health
43
insurance cost worthiness variable can be seen as synthesizing the outcome of the
margin principle for each respondent in the MEPS. More specifically, an individual,
based on her subjective standards (one’s preferences, self-knowledge, circumstances,
and costs and benefits of being insured), internally compares the marginal benefit of
being a health insurance beneficiary to its marginal cost, and then states whether
health insurance is worth its cost or not. If the subjectively perceived marginal
benefit exceeds the marginal cost, then the respondent expresses health insurance to
be “worthy.” If the subjectively perceived marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit
then the respondent expresses health insurance to be “not worthy”. The respondent
may also be indifferent and respond “uncertain.”
Given this assumption about the data generating process, which suggests that
agents behave rationally, we would expect some degree of consistency between the
expressed attitude towards health insurance cost worthiness in early rounds, and the
actual revealed choice of health insurance recorded after the last round of the MEPS,
if the rationality assumption is appropriate.
The findings in fact reveal that on average, relative to being uncertain, the in-
dividuals who think that health insurance is not worth its cost are less likely to be
privately or publicly insured, relatively to being uninsured. In addition, relative to
being uncertain, the individuals expressing health insurance to be worth its cost are
more likely to be insured (privately or publicly) over being uninsured. These results
validate the comparative statics predictions from the economic model, and the ad-
equacy of rationality as a guiding mechanism for the 2007 MEPS data generating
process. The results are also consistent with the past literature with respect to in-
dividuals’ skepticism toward health insurance. In fact the findings suggest relatively
more skepticism (dissatisfaction) toward public only coverage compared to having
some private coverage.
The remaining of the analysis is therefore organized as follows, section 2 formally
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motivates the hypotheses to be tested, section 3 develops the econometric model
which is a new variant of the Mixed-Logit model. Section 4 presents the data and
analytical strategy used, section 5 describes the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo
method of estimation implemented. Descriptive findings are presented in section 6,
while the econometric results are described in section 7. Section 8 provides discussion
and limitations, and finally section 9 concludes the analysis.
3.2 Motivation
Consider the following adaptation from the static model of health investments, and
health outcomes by Strauss and Thomas (2007, pp. 3380-3385) with the individual
static health production function represented as:1
H = H(N1, N ;SH , µ) (3.1)
where H is an array of measured health outcomes that depends on health insurance N1
and other health inputsN , which are assumed to be under the control of the agent. SH
is a vector of variables affecting the shape of the underlying health production function
such as age, socio-demographic characteristics, family background and environmental
factors. Measurement errors and the econometrician’s limited knowledge about the
agent, are captured by µ and represent unobserved characteristics.
Now assume the agent’s welfare depends on labor supply, L, and consumption
of goods and services, C, which may include health insurance, N1. Then utility, U ,
depends on health outcomes, H, as well as a vector of variables, SU of which SH is a
subset, that affect the shape of the utility function, and unobserved characteristics,
ξ. The unobserved characteristics include heterogeneity in tastes that may be related
to the unobserved characteristics affecting health production in equation (3.1) since
1The notation adopted in this section follows the standard notation presented by Strauss and
Thomas (2007, pp. 3380-3385). The initial model is however extended to explicitly account for
health insurance as an input in the health production function.
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preferences may themselves depend on innate healthiness. Therefore utility can be
expressed as:
U = U(C,L;H,SU , ξ). (3.2)
Because agents resource allocation decisions are constrained by their budget and time,
the budget constraint can be represented as:
PcC
∗ + Pn1N1 + PnN
c = WL+ V (3.3)
where V and W represent respectively the individual’s non-labor income and wage,
C∗ is the consumption not related to the health production with prices Pc. N1 is
the consumption of health insurance with price Pn1 , and N
c is the vector of other
purchased health inputs with price vector Pn.
Furthermore assume a person’s wage varies with the health output, H, the fac-
tors affecting labor productivity, Sw, and unobserved factors, α, such that the wage
function is expressed as:
W = W (H;Sw, α). (3.4)
Finally, assuming the amount of labor supply (L) varies with health output (H)
and, denoting the marginal utility of income as λ, then the individual’s maximization
problem is:
max
C,L
U(C,L;H,SU , ξ)
subject to PcC
∗ + Pn1N1 + PnN
c = WL+ V,
H(N1, N ;SH , µ),
W = W (H;Sw, α),
L = L(H).
(3.5)
The Lagrangian of this maximization problem is:
` = U (C,L;H(N1, N ;SH , µ), SU , ξ)
− λ [PcC∗ + Pn1N1 + PnN c −W (H(N1, N ;SH , µ);Sw, α) · L(H(N1, N ;SH , µ))− V ] ,
(3.6)
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Assuming an interior solution, then the first order condition with respect to health
insurance consumption is
∂U
∂C
· ∂C
∂N1
+
∂U
∂H
· ∂H
∂N1
= λ
(
Pn1 − L
[
∂W
∂H
· ∂H
∂N1
]
−W
[
∂L
∂H
· ∂H
∂N1
])
. (3.7)
The marginal utility of health insurance consumption ∂U
∂N1
= ∂U
∂C
· ∂C
∂N1
is zero if N1
is not valued in consumption, in which case it will not be an element of C in equation
(3.2). The right hand side of this first order condition suggests that if health insurance,
N1, raises wages or increases labor supply through improving health outcomes, H,
then the nominal cost of health insurance decreases, leading to more health insurance
consumption. In this formulation, the rate of change in the shadow cost of health
insurance can also depend on the level of health, H. This is in fact evidenced in the
biomedical literature by Haas and Brownly(2001), which suggests health outcomes
are related nonlinearly to health inputs.
From the first order condition when ∂U
∂C
· ∂C
∂N1
= 0 then we have an inequality, which
when rearranged can be written as:
λ >
∂U
∂H
· ∂H
∂N1
Pn1 − L[∂W∂H · ∂H∂N1 ]−W [ ∂L∂H · ∂H∂N1 ]
(3.8)
where the left hand side, λ, is the shadow cost of health insurance consumption 2,
and the right hand side interpreted as the real marginal health benefit of being a
health insurance beneficiary. The numerator provides the nominal marginal health
2Note the shadow cost of health insurance here is the real value of the resources that must be
given up for each unit of health insurance consumption. For private coverage this cost includes direct
premiums being paid. For public coverage, shifting of cost sharing burdens the beneficiaries. In 2007
income from social security accounted for roughly half, or more of the annual income for 80 percent
of public health insurance beneficiaries, with the average social security benefit being consumed
by cost-sharing for Medicare part B and part D premiums. Premiums collected from beneficiaries
represented 40 percent of total out-of-pocket spending by beneficiaries, or 10 percent of per capita
health care expenses in 2006. This figure represented 65.7 percent of average out-of-pocket spending
by beneficiaries in 2009 (Cubanski et al., 2009)
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benefit that is adjusted using the price measure in the denominator. Therefore the
equation (3.8) suggests that for the representative agent, when the shadow cost of
being a health insurance beneficiary is greater than its real marginal health benefit,
the agent will forgo insurance, otherwise the agent will purchase a non null amount
of health insurance.
Given this comparative static result, the following two hypotheses can be for-
mulated in conjunction with the data generating process assumption made in the
introduction for the adult respondents in the 2007 MEPS.
hypothesis1 : For the respondents that state health insurance is worth its cost, we
would expect on average the shadow cost of health insurance, λ, to be less than the
real marginal benefit derived from being a health insurance beneficiary, such that a
state of insurance is preferred over that of being uninsured.
hypothesis2 : For the respondents that state health insurance is not worth the cost,
on average, we would expect the shadow cost λ to be greater than the real marginal
benefit derived from health insurance consumption, such that an uninsured state
would be preferred over that of being insured. 3
The above two hypotheses provide a testable link between expressed attitude
towards health insurance cost worthiness, and revealed choice of health insurance.
Validation of these two hypotheses using the MEPS dataset would imply consistency
with the presented economic model’s predictions, and hence that the rationality as-
sumption (as discussed in the introduction) in the case of Health insurance choice by
3Note that the MEPS sample includes individuals with employer-sponsored health insurance.
Respondents might seem to have no choice, however the evidence in the literature suggests that
workers sorting across alternative employments reflect their tastes for health insurance, with indi-
viduals not valuing health insurance sorting into jobs that do not provide health insurance, and vice
versa (Goldstein and Pauly, 1976; Feldman et al., 1997; Monheit and Vistnes, 1999, 2008). For public
coverage, eligibility is necessary but not sufficient for coverage. Since enrollment is not automatic,
one still has to sign up to be a beneficiary.
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decision makers in the MEPS dataset is reasonable.
To test for the consistency of these two hypotheses, the expressed attitude toward
health insurance cost worthiness, and the revealed choice of health insurance variables
are jointly modeled, conditional on a set of covariates within the panel-like Error
Components Mixed Logit framework developed in the next section. For an exposition
of mixed logit as currently used in the literature see (Train, 2009, p. 134-150). The
two jointly modeled variables are factors each with 3 levels. For the stated attitude
variable, the levels are (uncertain, worthy, not worthy), while the insurance choice
variable has levels (uninsured, Any private, public Only). The econometric framework
is developed in the next section.
3.3 Panel-Like Error Components Mixed-Logit Specification
Mixed logit is a highly flexible behavioral economic model that can approximate any
random utility model (McFadden and Train, 2000) 4. The standard mixed logit model
has choice probabilities that can be represented in the form:
Pij =
∫
Lij(θ)f(θ)d(θ) j = 1, . . . ,m (3.9)
where Pij is the probability that individual i chooses alternative j among a set of m
alternatives, and Lij(θ) is the logit probability evaluated at θ:
Lij(θ) =
eVij(θ)∑m
k=1 e
Vik(θ)
j = 1, . . . ,m (3.10)
f(θ) is a density function and Vij(θ) represents the observed portion of utility which
depends on the parameters θ. When utility is linear in θ, then Vij(θ) can potentially be
represented in two ways according to whether or not regressors vary across alternatives
(Cameron and Trevedi, 2005, p. 500). Vij(θ) = θ
′
ijWi relies on individual specific
4The notation adopted in this section follows the standard notation for mixed logit discrete choice
modeling, see Train (2009, p. 134-150)
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variables Wi , that are constant over alternatives, leading to the multinomial logit
representation. When the model relies exclusively on regressors that vary across
alternatives, then Vij(θ) = θ
′
iWij which leads to the conditional logit representation.
The application of mixed logit in the literature has concerned itself exclusively with
the later conditional logit representation (Brownstone and Train, 1999; David and
Greene, 2003; Dean et al., 2009; Hess et al., 2006; King et al., 2007; Srinivasan and
Mahamassani, 2005). This specification allows the analyst to capture decision makers’
tastes as they relate to the characteristics of the choice options.
The main interest in the current analysis is to model decision makers’ preferences,
which under the rational agent paradigm are assumed to be stable across the set of
choice alternatives. Preferences depend on the characteristics of the decision maker
and her environment, rather than the characteristics of the choice options. This is
assumption is necessary in this application since the MEPS dataset does not include
information on the characteristics of the choices available to respondents. There-
fore, the former representation of Vij(θ) = θ
′
ijWi is adopted. The multinomial logit
representation is adopted here in an attempt to fill the void in the literature, but
also because it relies on regressors that are fixed across choice alternatives, which
allows one to model agents’ stable preferences. With the multinomial logit repre-
sentation, Vij(θ) = θ
′
ijWi, an identification restriction is needed to ensure the logit
formula e
θ
′
ijWi∑m
k=1 e
θ
′
ik
Wi
sums to one, over all m choice alternatives. The usual restric-
tion of θ
′
i1 = 0 is imposed (Cameron and Trevedi, 2005, p. 500), making the first
alternative the base alternative, and the mixed logit probability represented as:
Pij =
∫ (
eθ
′
ijWi∑m
k=1 e
θ
′
ikWi
)
f(θ)d(θ) j = 1, . . . ,m (3.11)
which is a weighted average of the standard logit formula evaluated at different values
of θ, with weights given by the mixing density function f(θ). The mixing distribution
f(θ) can be discrete, with θ taking a finite set of distinct values. In most applications
of standard mixed logit, the mixing density is specified to be continuous (King et al.,
50
2007) . Assuming normal mixing density, then θ ∼ N(β,G) and the choice probability
becomes:
Pij =
∫ (
eθ
′
ijWi∑m
k=1 e
θ
′
ikWi
)
φ(θ|β,G)d(θ) j = 1, . . . ,m (3.12)
where φ(θ|β,G) is the normal density with mean β, and covariance G. The task then
is to estimate β, and covariance G.
The mixed logit probability can be derived from individuals’ utility maximizing
behavior in various ways. The most widely used approach is based on random coeffi-
cients (Dean et al., 2009; King et al., 2007), this analysis however relies on the error
components approach following (Brownstone and Train, 1999). In this case, utility is
specified as:
Uij = β
′
ijXi + b
′
iZi + ij, (3.13)
where Xi and Zi are vectors of observed variables for individual i, βij are fixed coef-
ficients, bi is a set of random terms with zero mean and covariance G, and ij is iid
extreme value. The terms in Zi are error components which create correlations among
the utilities for different alternatives, and along with ij, define the stochastic portion
of utility. That is, the random portion of utility is ξij = b
′
iZi + ij. Utility is corre-
lated across choice alternative because cov(ξij, ξik) = E(b
′
iZi+ij)(b
′
iZi+ik) = Z
′
iGZi,
where G is the covariance of bi.
Letting θ
′
ij =
〈
β
′
ij, b
′
i
〉
and W
′
i =
〈
X
′
i , Z
′
i
〉
then the utility function can be written
as
Uij = θ
′
ijWi + ij, (3.14)
Note that the identification restriction (θ
′
i1 = 0) imposed on the logit formula trans-
lates into a one dimensional reduction of the utility function. This takes care of the
fact that only utility differences matter to the decision maker when choosing among
a set of alternatives (Train, 2009, p. 19-20). In this case utility differences are consid-
ered with respect to the first alternative. The decision maker knows the value of his
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own θ
′
ij and ij for all alternatives and chooses alternative j if and only if Uij > Uik
for all j 6= k. The researcher on the other hand observes the components of Wi, but
not θij or the ij’s. If the elements of θij were observed, then the choice probability
would be the probability conditional on θij:
Lij(θij) =
eθ
′
ijWi∑m
k=1 e
θ
′
ikWi
(3.15)
because the θij are unobserved by the researcher, the above conditional probability
cannot be specified. Therefore the unconditional probability which averages over all
θij is specified as the integral of Lij(θij) over all possible θij :
Pij =
∫ (
eθ
′
ijWi∑m
k=1 e
θ
′
ikWi
)
φ(θ)d(θ) (3.16)
which is the mixed logit probability with normal weighting density as represented in
equation (3.12).
To allow for repeated choices by each sampled decision maker, a panel-like error
components representation of the utility function is used. This is achieved by defining
the utility of individual i in choice situation t choosing alternative j as:
Uijt = βijtXi + biZi + ijt ∀ j = 1, 2, 3; t = 1, 2 (3.17)
with ijt being iid extreme value with zero mean and a given variance over alterna-
tives, choice situations, and decision makers. In the current application, each adult
respondent can be seen as making a choice among three mutually exclusive alter-
natives in each of the two choice situations representing the stated preference and
revealed preference for health insurance. The sequence of chosen alternatives, one
for each choice situation is c = {c1, c2}. Conditional on θ the probability that the
individual makes this sequence of choices is the product of the logit formulas:
Lic =
2∏
t=1
(
eθ
′
ict
Wi∑3
k=1 e
θ
′
ikt
Wi
)
(3.18)
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since the ijt are iid over choice situations. The unconditional probability of the
sequence of choice, with the normal mixing density is then obtained by integrating
Lic over all values of θ:
Pic =
∫ 2∏
t=1
(
eθ
′
ict
Wi∑3
k=1 e
θ
′
ikt
Wi
)
φ(θ)d(θ) (3.19)
The only distinction introduced by the panel-like representation for repeated
choices over the single choice case, is that the integral now involves a product of
logit formulas, rather than just one single logit formula. These choice probabilities
can be estimated through simulation from a classical stand point, or using Bayesian
Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. Because of the multidimensionality of the choice
probabilities, and also the intractability in integrating over the random effects (Mc-
Culloch and Searle, 2001), we refer to Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods to estimate the model. MCMC methods provide an alternative strategy for
marginalizing the random effects that may be more robust than the techniques used
to approximate the integrals (Zhao et al., 2006; Brown and Draper, 2006).
The panel-like error components mixed logit model as described here overcomes
the independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) restriction that characterizes the
standard multinomial logit.5 This is because the denominators of the logit formulas
are inside the integrals and do not cancel when the ratio of mixed logit probabilities
are taken. This ratio
Pij
Pik
still depends on all the data not just on the information
pertaining to the two considered alternatives. The model allows for the correlation of
utility across choice situations, choice alternatives, and individuals. For any two indi-
viduals (ind1, ind2) for example, the correlations of utility across individuals, choice
situations (t1, t2) and alternatives (j1, j2) can be graphically represented as shown in
figure(3.1).
The model also captures individuals’ preference rankings over various choice al-
5see Train (2009, p. 45-50) for a full exposition of the IIA property.
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Figure 3.1: Levels of utility correlations in the model. utility correlation across choice alternatives,
corr(j1, j2) comes from the assumption of stable preference across a set of mutually exclusive alter-
natives, by rational choice theory. Utility correlation across choice situations, corr(t1, t2) is also from
rational choice theory, and suggests preference stability (or choice consistency) across choice situa-
tions. Utility correlations across individuals, corr(Ind1, Ind2) comes from the Multilevel-stratified
structure of the MEPS dataset, creating preference interactions across decision makers.
ternatives, since for each individual, a unique fixed effect β is estimated for each
alternative j in choice situation t, conditional on each regressor. Variations across
choice situations of the estimated fixed effects for a given decision maker and re-
gressor, allow for the possibility of preference reversal, or choice inconsistency across
choice situations.
This possibility of choice inconsistency across choice situations is what allow us
to use this model to test the above two hypotheses, by investigating the consistency
between stated attitude toward health insurance cost worthiness and the revealed
choice of health insurance by the adult respondents in the MEPS.
3.4 Data and Analytical Strategy
The empirical analysis is based upon data from the 2007 Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) full year population characteristics data. The survey is sponsored
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by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality(AHRQ), and designed to over-
lap two calendar years with a new Panel of sample households selected each year.
The household component of the MEPS collects data from a subsample of the Na-
tional Health Interview Survey and uses stratified and clustered random sampling
with weights that produce nationally representative estimates for a wide range of
health-related demographic and socioeconomic characteristics for the civilian, non-
institutionalized U.S. population. The data from the calendar year 2007 was collected
in rounds 1, 2, and 3 for MEPS panel 12 and rounds 3, 4, and 5 for MEPS panel 11.
The survey includes questions on respondents’ attitudes toward health insurance
and health insurance cost, in a self-administered questionnaire (SAQ) which was ad-
ministrated in round 2 for panel 12 and round 4 for panel 11. Although the 2007
MEPS includes 30964 individuals, interviewed over the 2-year period, the target pop-
ulation for the SAQ only include adults (person age 18 or older) in the civilian non
institutionalized population amounting to 19067 respondents. After accounting for
questionnaire non response, the final sample used in this analysis is comprised of
18045 individuals 18 to 85 that were member of the civilian, non-institutionalized
portion of the U.S. population in 2007. For more information on the MEPS sampling
design, see Ezzati-Rice et al. (2008).
The dependent variables in this study are of two kinds, individuals’ attitude to-
wards health insurance cost worthiness “ATTHICW,” and individual’s health insur-
ance coverage indicator “INSURANCE.” The variable ATTHICW is constructed from
the variable ADINSB42 provided in the MEPS dataset which is a factor with 5 levels
(1. Disagree strongly, 2. Disagree somewhat, 3. Uncertain, 4. Agree somewhat, 5.
Agree strongly), relating to the statement: Health insurance is not worth the cost.
The variable is recoded into ATTHICW as a factor of 3 levels (1– Uncertain, 2–
Agree, 3–Disagree), which is interpreted as (1– Uncertain, 2– Not worthy, 3–worthy)
and represents the stated attitude towards health insurance cost. The second depen-
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dent variable INSURANCE is constructed from INSCOV07 provided in the MEPS
dataset which summarizes health insurance coverage for each respondent.6
Because we wish to use “uninsured” as the base category in the estimation, the
INSURANCE variable is constructed as a factor with three levels (1. Uninsured,
2. Private, 3.Public). Hence both dependent variables are factors each with three
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.
Interests here centers on a postulated causal influence from the attributes and en-
vironment of individual respondents to their responses. The alternative invariant co-
variates on which the joint distribution of the two dependent variables is conditioned,
include demographic characteristics such as AGE, SEX, EDUCATION, INCOME;
health characteristics; and the respondent’s marital status. Definitions and summary
statistics for the independent variables are given in table (3.1).
To ensure valid inferences about the entire adult population in the U.S., care needs
to be taken to account for the stratified design structure of the MEPS dataset. The
variables VARSTR and VARPSU provided in the MEPS dataset are used to identify
the sample strata and primary sampling units (PSU) required for appropriate variance
estimation. For the 2007 MEPS full year file, there are 328 variance strata, with either
two to three variance estimation PSUs per stratum. So in addition to the above fixed
effects variables, the two variables VARSTR and VARPSU are introduced into the
model to capture random stratum and PSU effects, respectively. The corresponding
utility representation leading to the observed sequence of choice outcomes ∀ i =
6INSCOV07 assumes three possible values: 1 = ANY PRIVATE(respondent had any private in-
surance coverage providing at minimum benefits for hospital and physician services[including TRI-
CARE and MEDIGAP] any time during 2007), 2 = PUBLIC ONLY (respondent reported coverage
only under MEDICARE, MEDICAID,or SCHIP, or other public hospital/physician programs during
2007), 3 = UNINSURED (respondents was uninsured during all of 2007). Note that these three cat-
egories are mutually exclusive, and respondents with both private insurance/TRICARE and public
insurance are coded as “1”
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1, · · · , N ; j = 1, · · · , 3; t = 1, 2; k = 1, · · · , 328; l = 1, · · · , 3; is given by:
Uklijt = µijt + Sk + PSUlk + USUilk + klijt (3.20)
where Uklijt is the utility from alternative j in choice situation t by individual i in
primary sampling unit l within strata k. This utility is a linear function of a fixed
effect µijt, a random strata effect Sk, a random primary sampling unit effect PSUlk,
a random individual effect USUilk, and a disturbance term klijt. Recalling the one
dimensional identification restriction in each choice situation, and abstracting from
the nesting indexes l and k, then for each individual i, we have a ((3 − 1) + (3 −
1)) = 4-dimensional vector of relative latent utilities Ui. Note that the identification
restriction imposed reduces the number of alternatives in each choice situation by
one for each individual. This normalization ensures that the choice probabilities
sum to one in each choice situation, and sets the normalizing alternative, which
here is the first alternative in each choice situation, as the base alternative. The
above equation(3.20) is equivalent to the Panel-like Error Components mixed logit
representation of the utility function in equation (3.17) where βijtXi = µijt, biZi =
Sk + PSUlk + USUilk and ijt = klijt.
The random components Sk, PSUlk, USUilk are distributed with zero means, and
variances represented respectively by Vs for the between stratum variations, Vsp for
primary sampling units variations within strata, and Vspi for the between individuals
variations within primary sampling units within strata. Unlike Vs and Vsp which are
scalar variances, Vspi is a covariance matrix that represents variations across choice
alternatives and choice situations between individuals as shown in equation (3.21)
7. After accounting for these three sources of variations, all remaining variations are
7In the representation of Vspi , pr = Private, pu = Public, w = worthy, and nw = notworthy.
σprpr : utility variability between individuals choosing private coverage over being uninsured; σww:
utility variability between individuals with “worthy” preference over “uncertain”; σprpu : utility
covariation between individuals with private coverage and individuals with public coverage, both
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standard iid and captured by the disturbance term klijt.
Vspi =

σprpr σprpu σprnw σprw
. σpupu σpunw σpuw
. . σnwnw σnww
. . . σww

(3.21)
Using this covariance matrix Vspi , we check for the consistency of the two hypothe-
ses, by observing the signs and significance of the covariance coefficients, with special
interest on the coefficients between choice alternatives across choice situations. If the
first hypothesis is valid, we will expect a positive and significant covariation between
the “worthy” attitude and any of the “private” and “public” insurance options. These
two covariance coefficients are represented by σprw and σpuw. If the second hypothesis
is also valid, we will expect a negative and significant covariance coefficient between
the “not worthy” attitude and any of the two “private” and “public” insurance op-
tions. The covariance coefficients in this case are represented by σprnw and σpunw
respectively.
Because of the multidimensionality of the choice probabilities, and also the in-
tractability in integrating over the random effects (McCulloch and Searle, 2001), we
use Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to estimate the model.
MCMC methods provide an alternative strategy for marginalizing the random effects
that may be more robust than the techniques used to approximate the integrals (Zhao
et al., 2006; Brown and Draper, 2006).
3.5 MCMC Sampling Schemes for Model Parameters
As described in equation (3.17) and (3.20), the panel-like error components mixed
logit model, is just a spacial case of the more general class of Generalized Linear
relative to being uninsured σprw: utility covariation between individuals with private coverage and
individuals with the “worthy” preference
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Mixed Models (GLMMs), with a categorical outcome variable and a specified logit
link function. Therefore, following the standard multivariate notation adopted for
GLMMs (Hadfield, 2010), the standardized 4-dimensional vector of latent utilities Ui
for each individual i in equation (3.17) can be stacked into a single column vector
across all N individuals in the sample. In this form, we obtain a 4N -dimensional
latent vector U of utilities for the whole sample of respondents with
U = Xβ + Zu + e (3.22)
where X is a design matrix relating the fixed predictors to the data, and Z is a design
matrix relating random predictors to the data. These predictors have associated pa-
rameter vector β ∼ N(β0,B), and u ∼ N(0,G). The residuals vector is represented
by e ∼ N(0,R). In this formulation B, G and R are the expected (co)variance
matrices of the fixed effects, random effects and residuals, respectively. They are typ-
ically unknown, and must be estimated from the data. Recalling that in a Bayesian
analysis no distinction is made between fixed and random effects, as all effects are
considered random, we can combine the design matrices (W = [X,Z]) and also the
parameters (θ = [β
′
,u
′
]), and rewrite equation (3.22) as:
U = Wθ + e (3.23)
The prior distribution for the location effects θ is multivariate normal, with the zero
off-diagonal implying a priory independence between fixed effects and random effects.
θ =
β
u
 ∼ N

β0
0
 ,
B 0
0 G

 (3.24)
The goal of the analysis is to estimate θ. The prior for θ can be Gibbs sampled
in a single block using the method of Gracia-Cortes and Sorensen (2001) as explained
below. With conjugate priors, the variance structures (R and G) follow an inverse-
Wishart distribution which can also be Gibbs sampled in a single block. The variance
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structures (R and G) for the model in equation(3.22) are represented as:
G =

V1 ⊗A1 0 0
0 V2 ⊗A2 0
0 0 V3 ⊗A3
 (3.25)
where the zeros off-diagonal represent the independence between component terms,
and (⊗) is the Kronecker product which allows for dependence between random effects
within a component term. V1⊗A1 is the expected (co)variance matrix at the stratum
level, V2⊗A2 the expected (co)variance matrix at the PSU level, and V3⊗A3 is the
expected (co)variance matrix at the individual level. The (co)variance matrices (V)
are low-dimensional and are to be estimated, while the structured matrices (A) are
high dimensional and treated as known. Each diagonal element in equation (3.25)
corresponds to a component term in the random effect structure of equation (3.20).
That is V1 ⊗A1 = Vs · 1, V2 ⊗A2 = Vsp · 1, and V3 ⊗A3 = Vspi ⊗ 16(I4 + 14). The
effects of the independent random components are additive, such that equation (3.25)
can be equivalently represented as:
G = (V1 ⊗A1)⊕ (V2 ⊗A2)⊕ (V3 ⊗A3) (3.26)
In multinomial data each observation is a single sample from a distribution over say
m categorical outcomes, therefore the residual variance is not identified by the data.
The residual variance covariance matrix must then be set to some arbitrary value
which, when proper priors are used, does not pose a problem in a Bayesian analysis.
Following recommendations by Hadfield (2010), the residual (co)variance matrix in
our choice model is represented as:
R =
1
m1 +m2
(I(m1+m2)−2 + 1(m1+m2)−2) =
1
6
(I4 + 14) (3.27)
where m1 = 3 and m2 = 3 represent the number of choice alternatives in each of
the two choice situations corresponding respectively to the expressed attitude toward
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health insurance cost worthiness, and the revealed health insurance choice. I4 and 14
are the (4)-dimensional identity matrix, and unit matrix, respectively.
3.5.1 Updating the latent utilities
For a given individual, the conditional density of the (4)-dimensional latent utility
vector Ui is given by:
P (Ui|y,θ,R,G) ∝ fi(yi|Ui)fN(ei|riR−1/i e/i, ri − riR−1/i r
′
i) (3.28)
where fN represents the multivariate normal distribution with specified mean vector
and (co)variance matrix. Hence equation (3.28) suggests that the conditional density
of the latent vector of utilities for individual i, is proportional to the product of the
conditional distribution of the joint outcome yi, given the vector of latent utilities Ui
and the joint probability density of the utility residuals. The (4)-dimensional vector
of latent utility residuals ei for individual i follows a conditional normal distribution,
where the conditioning is on the (4) × (N − 1) residuals associated with the other
individuals in the sample. The notation /i denotes vectors or matrices with the ith row
and or column removed. This conditioning accounts for residual correlation across
individuals.
Since latent utilities are updated in blocks of correlated residuals, correlations
occurs across each of the (4) alternative residuals for a given individual. This is
achieved through block sampling, where a block is a group of residuals expected to
be correlated in equation (3.23). Equation (3.28) can then be rewritten as:
P (Uk|y,θ,R,G) ∝ pi(yi|Uk)fN(ek|0,Rk) (3.29)
where k indexes blocks of latent utilities in equation (3.23), that have non-zero residual
covariances. Because residuals are correlated across choice situations, alternatives and
individuals, we have a total of (N)× (4) residual correlations, with k = 1. Therefore
the conditional density of each latent utility Uijt for all i = 1 · · ·N , j = 1 · · ·m − 1,
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and t = 1, 2, is obtained by conditioning each eijt on the remaining (3)+(N−1)× (4)
residuals.
The average posterior (co)variance matrix M of the single block (4) × (N) di-
mensional vector Uk with k = 1 is updated at each iteration of the burn-in period
following Haario et al. (2001). An efficient multivariate proposal density with co-
variance matrix νM is determined using adaptive methods during the burn-in phase.
The scalar ν is obtained using the method of Ovaskainen et al. (2008) so that the
proportion of successful jumps in the Markov Chain is optimal at a rate of 0.23 for
the (4)× (N) multidimensional vector Uk with k = 1 (Gelman et al., 2004).
3.5.2 Updating the location vector ((θ = [β
′
,u
′
]))
The location vector θ is sampled as a block using a method by Gracia-Cortes and
Sorensen (2001) which involves solving the sparse linear system:
θ˜ = C−1W
′
R−1(U−Wθ? − e?) (3.30)
This system is solved using cholemia factorization from the Sparse library in R by
Davis (2006). C is a sparse matrix (populated primarily with zeros) representing the
model coefficient matrix:
C = W
′
R−1W +
B−1 0
0 G−1
 (3.31)
θ? = [β
′
?,u
′
?] and e? are random draws from the multivariate normal distributions:β?
u?
 ∼ N

β0
0
 ,
B 0
0 G

 (3.32)
and
e? ∼ N(Wθ?,R) (3.33)
A realization from the required probability distribution P (θ|U,W,R,G) is then
obtained as θ˜ + θ?
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3.5.3 Updating the variance structure G and R
Since the residual(co)variance matrix R is not identified, and thus cannot be es-
timated from the data, its elements are kept fixed as specified in equation (3.27).
All information for its estimation comes from the inverse-Wishart prior distribution,
following a conditional sampling strategy provided by Korsgaard et al. (1999).
For the G structure as represented in equation (3.26), the sum of squares matrix
associated with each of the three random components has the form:
S = φ
′
A−1φ (3.34)
where φ is a matrix of random effects with each row indexing the relevant row/column
of A, and each column indexing the relevant row/column in V, and also A and V
defined as in equation (3.25) and equation(3.26). The parameter (co)variance matrix
can then be sampled from the inverse-Wishart distribution:
V ∼ IW((Sp + S)−1, np + n) (3.35)
where Sp and np are the prior sum of squares and prior degree’s of freedom, respec-
tively, and n is the number of rows in the matrix of random effects φ.
3.6 Descriptive Findings
The unconditional joint and marginal distributions of the two dependent variables
are presented in table (3.2). Recall that ATTHICW captures a respondent’s stated
health insurance preference in early rounds of the survey, while INSURANCE cap-
tures the health insurance outcome as recorded at the end of the survey panel. The
marginal distribution of the insurance preference variable in table (3.2) suggests that
for the majority of the respondents, 61.45%, health insurance is worth its cost, for
24.48% health insurance is not worth its cost, and the remaining 14.07% are uncer-
tain. Similarly the marginal distribution of the insurance coverage indicator suggests
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that, 62.17% of the respondents have some private insurance, 19.54% are only publicly
insured, and 18.29% are uninsured.
Now focusing on the joint distribution in table (3.2), for the 62.17% recorded as
having some private insured in 2007, 41% responded health insurance is worth its cost,
14.54% stated health insurance is not worth its cost, while the remaining, 6.63% were
uncertain. For the 19.54% recorded as only publicly insured, the majority, 12.34%,
responded health insurance is worth its cost, 3.75% stated health insurance is not
worth its cost, with the remaining 3.44% uncertain. Similarly for the 18.29% recorded
as uninsured, 8.10% expressed health insurance to be worth its cost, 6.19% responded
health insurance is not worth its cost, while only 4% were uncertain.
The second column of Table (3.3) presents the results of the Chi-squared test for
differences in the probabilities of belonging to one of the 3 health insurance cate-
gories (uninsured, some private, public only). The Chi-squared statistic of 6752.032
and corresponding p-value < 2.2e-16, strongly suggests the insurance choice categories
differ in frequency. The third column of Table (3.3) presents the Chi-squared test for
dependence between the insurance choice outcome indicator and the insurance pref-
erence indicator. The Chi-squared statistics of 628.0411 and corresponding p-value
< 2.2e-16, also strongly suggest health insurance choice is dependent on expressed
health insurance preference. The econometric framework is implemented to account
for covariates that affect the joint distribution of the two dependent variables. The
next section presents the results of the econometric estimation.
3.7 Econometric Results
The described estimation procedure in section 5 for the panel-like error components
mixed logit model developed in section 3, is implemented by adapting the R package
MCMCglmm by Hadfield (2010) introduced in the quantitative genetics literature.
Since the aim of this study is to test the two hypotheses generated in section 2 as
64
explained in section 4, the focus of interpretation of the results is on the estimated
covariance matrix representing variations between individuals across choice alterna-
tives and choice situations as shown in equation (3.21). This result is summarized in
equation (3.36).
Before proceeding to interpret the results in equation (3.36), it’s important to note
that the complete set of results for the estimated model is presented in table (3.4),
and subsequent trace plots in the appendix. Table (3.4) shows the posterior means
of the variances Vs, Vsp and Vspi for the three random effects in the model, with their
corresponding 95% credible intervals. All estimated coefficients have corresponding
95% credible intervals that do not contain zero, suggesting their significance at the 5%
level.
Vspi =

0.5543 0.6631 -0.2328 1.2172
. 1.2224 -0.8153 0.8168
. . 3.8275 1.7720
. . . 7.5979

(3.36)
With regards to the two hypotheses of interest in this study, the result σprw =
1.2172 in equation (3.36) suggests that on average, compared to being uncertain,
adults expressing health insurance to be worth its cost are more likely to have some
private insurance relative to being uninsured. Similarly σpuw = 0.8168 suggests that
relative to expressing an uncertain preference, individuals expressing health insurance
to be worth its cost are more likely to be publicly only insured compared to being
uninsured.
The two results in the above paragraph are consistent with the first hypothesis
which stipulates that on average MEPS respondents stating health insurance to be
worth its cost, will tend to have a shadow cost of health insurance that is less than
the real marginal benefit from health insurance consumption, such that an insured
state is preferred (whether private or public) over that of being uninsured.
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The strength of likeliness to seek health insurance over being uninsured for respon-
dents that express health insurance to be worth its cost, relative to being uncertain, is
stronger for individuals with some private coverage, compared to those with only pub-
lic coverage (1.2172>0.8168). This observation suggests that on average, for MEPS
respondents, the level of optimism toward (or satisfaction from) having some private
coverage tends to exceed that of having only public coverage.
The result σprnw = −0.2328 in equation (3.36) suggests on average compared to
being uncertain, the individuals expressing health insurance to not be worth its cost,
are less likely to have some private insurance, relative to being uninsured. Similarly
σpunw = −0.8153 suggests that on average, relative to being uncertain, adult respon-
dents expressing health insurance to not be worth its cost are less likely to be only
publicly insured, relative to being uninsured.
These results are consistent with the second hypothesis which suggests that on
average respondents stating health insurance to not be worth its cost will have a
shadow cost of health insurance consumption that exceeds the real marginal benefit
derived from health insurance consumption, such that an uninsured state is preferred
over that of being insured (whether privately or publicly).
The strength of unlikeliness to seek health insurance for those that expressed
health insurance to not be worth its cost relative to being uncertain is stronger for
public only coverage compared to having some private coverage (0.8153>0.2328). This
observation suggest that on average, for MEPS respondents, the level of skepticism
of (or dissatisfaction from) public only coverage tend to exceed that of having some
private coverage.
3.8 Discussion and Limitations
The evidence from the econometric estimation validates the two hypotheses. This
implies consistency with the presented economic model’s predictions in section 2,
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and further suggests that the rationality assumption as a guiding mechanism for the
2007 MEPS data generating process, in the context of health insurance choice, is
reasonable.
A potential limitation however of this study comes from the fact that public cov-
erage is only available to individuals of a certain age and income category. Therefore
there is a selectivity issue associated with enrollment in this category that can po-
tentially bias inferential results. The inclusion of income and age as covariates in the
model accounts however for their effects on the distributional properties of individual
respondents across the 3 insurance indicator categories. Furthermore, in this analy-
sis, no conclusions are drawn with respect to the effect of the covariates on the joint
distribution of the two dependents variables. Interest lies exclusively in the correla-
tion between the levels of the dependent variables controlling for important covariates
defining respondents stable preferences as they relate to the choice process. As such,
this limitation has mild significance in the analysis.
In addition to providing an answer to the intended question of interest, the study
produces results that are consistent with the past literature, with respect to individ-
uals’ satisfaction (or optimism) toward health insurance consumption. The results in
fact suggest relatively more skepticism (dissatisfaction) toward public only coverage
compared to having some private coverage. This is because the strength of unlikeli-
ness to seek health insurance for those that expressed health insurance to not be worth
its cost relative to being uncertain, is stronger for public only coverage compared to
having some private coverage. In their review of evidence regarding enrollment into
a variety of public programs Remler et al. (2001) note that “it may well be that
potential recipients do not value health insurance as strongly as policy analysts do– a
possibility worth exploring in depth.”(p.15). Also Peterson (2004) notes that among
important lessons learned regarding state efforts to expend health insurance cover-
age is that “ because many. . . do not understand or are skeptical about the value of
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insurance, offering coverage does not translate into people accepting it” (p.174).
A possible explanation for such relative skepticism (dissatisfaction) in public cov-
erage observed for MEPS respondents is that in the U.S., having only public health
insurance such as the Medicare fee-for-service program, provide limited coverage to
beneficiaries. The plan has substantial cost-sharing requirements and fails to cover for
example preventive care or, until not too long ago, prescriptive drugs. On the other
hand private coverage provides an alternative with relatively more comprehensive
coverage, although with less provider choice. Individuals’ skepticism (or dissatisfac-
tion) may be suggestive that respondents value relatively more the depth of coverage
(obtained from having some private insurance) than the range of provider (available
from public only insurance).
3.9 Conclusion
The rational choice approach by assuming individuals make decisions in a rational,
rather than stochastic manner, has allowed economists and other social scientists to
model behavior and make predictions about future actions. The whole field of discrete
choice modeling in economics has relied on the theoretical vision of rational choice
theory by assuming agents behave rationally in the choices they make.
The increasing criticism however, of this theoretical vision in the literature because
of conflicting evidence from experimental studies, has suggested the importance of
testing for the validity of this assumption in a discrete choice modeling situation prior
to proceeding with the modeling exercise. Since no such test has been performed in
the literature to the best of my knowledge, this paper has attempted to fill this void
by presenting a framework for testing the rationality assumption in discrete choice
modeling with application to health insurance choice in the U.S., using the 2007
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey dataset.
For this purpose, a new variant of the mixed logit model was introduced, which
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relied on the multinomial logit representation of the weighted logit formula, rather
than the currently used conditional logit representation in the literature. This repre-
sentation allowed for the joint modeling of the conditional distribution of respondents’
stated preference for health insurance in earlier rounds with revealed health insurance,
controlling for a set of alternative invariant covariates capturing respondents’stable
preferences as assumed by rational choice theory.
The model was then estimated within the Bayesian framework by adapting the R
package MCMCglmm (Hadfield, 2010) introduced in the quantitative genetics litera-
ture. Observation of the signs and significance of the estimated covariance coefficients
between the levels of the two jointly modeled categorical dependent variables using
the variance covariance matrix at the individuals’ level, provided the test for the
adequacy of the rational choice assumption in this case.
The findings revealed that on average, relative to being uncertain, the individuals
expressing health insurance to not be worth its cost were less likely to have some
private insurance or be only publicly insured, relative to being uninsured. In addition
relative to being uncertain, individuals expressing health insurance to be worth its
cost were more likely to be insured (privately or publicly) over being uninsured.
Moreover, the findings showed consistency with the past literature with respect to
individuals’ skepticism toward health insurance in the U.S. (Remler et al., 2001;
Peterson, 2004), and suggested relatively more skepticism (dissatisfaction) toward
public coverage compared to having some private coverage.
Overall, the results validated the adequacy of rationality as a guiding mechanism
for the 2007 MEPS data generating process, and further allowed for the conclusion
that the evidence is not enough to reject the idea that adults in the U.S. behave
rationally in their choices of health insurance. Therefore one can safely proceed to
model adults’ health insurance choices in the U.S. within the discrete choice modeling
framework.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for the independent variables in the model
N = 18035 Mean SD
Demographic characteristics
AGE age of respondent in years 46.16 17.444
SEX = 1 if respondent is female 0.542 0.498
EDUCYR years of schooling 12.49 3.217
INCOME income in $1000 29.998 31.472
Health characteristics
VERGOOD = 1 if very good health 0.3342 0.472
GOOD = 1 if good health 0.3259 0.469
FAIRPOOR = 1 if fair or poor health 0.1645 0.371
Marital Status
MARRIED = 1 if currently married 0.5621 0.496
PMARRIED = 1 if previously married 0.2022 0.402
Variance estimation Var.
VARSTR variance estimation stratum 534.3 489.89
VARPSU variance estimation PSU 1.664 0.627
Table 3.2: Cross tabulation of attitudes toward (Atthicw) and purchase of (Insurance)
insurance. Values are in percentage.
Attitude (Atthicw)
Insurance Uncertain Not Worth Worth Marginal
Uninsured 4.00 6.19 8.10 18.29
Some Private 6.63 14.54 41.00 62.17
Public Only 3.44 3.75 12.35 19.54
Marginal 14.07 24.48 61.45 100
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Table 3.3: Significance test results on the joint unconditional distribution of Insurance
and Atthicw.
χ2 test for differences in the Pearson χ2 test for dependence
probabilities of enrolling between outcomes
χ2 statistics 6752.032 628.04
df 2 4
p-value < 2.2e− 16 < 2.2e− 16
5% Significance yes yes
Table 3.4: Posterior means and 95% credible intervals for random effects variances
Post. mean L-95 Percent CI U-95 Percent CI
Between stratum variation
Vs 0.1112 0.02353 0.1758
PSU variation within strata
Vsp 0.0838 0.02353 0.1413
Variation across individuals within PSU within strata
σprnw -0.2328 -0.3984 -0.0010
σpunw -0.8153 -1.0815 -0.4237
σprw 1.2172 0.9331 1.5444
σpuw 0.8168 0.4880 1.1570
σprpr 0.5543 0.2996 0.9408
σprpu 0.6631 0.2538 1.2533
σpupu 1.2224 0.5146 2.2353
σnwnw 3.8275 1.0911 6.2453
σnww 1.7720 0.4049 3.6088
σww 7.5979 4.8008 10.6073
Iterations 20000
Thinning interval 10000
Drawn sample size 2000
DIC 54695.96
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CHAPTER 4
MODELING ADULTS HEALTH INSURANCE ENROLLMENT
DECISIONS IN THE U.S., UNDER PREFERENCES ENDOGENEITY:
A BAYESIAN MULTINOMIAL PROBIT APPROACH
4.1 Introduction
The results of the previous chapter suggest that adult respondents in the 2007 MEPS
make their health insurance choices in a way consistent with rational choice theory
predictions. It is therefore reasonable to use the discrete choice modeling framework
which relies on the assumption that decision makers are rational, to model adults’
health insurance choices. Of interest is the effects of stated health insurance prefer-
ences, on revealed choices of health insurance. In fact, in economics choice theory
is based on the twin concepts of willingness and ability to pay. Within the context
of health insurance enrollment decisions, attitudinal questions capturing individuals
preferences for health insurance have been shown to have strong predictive power on
actual choice behavior (Keane, 2004; Parente et al., 2004).
Early work by Goldstein and Pauly (1976) and Feldman et al. (1997) suggest that
workers sorting among employment alternatives reflect their tastes for employment-
sponsored health insurance. Monheit and Vistnes (1999), using attitudinal measures,
found that weak preferences for health insurance are an important factor in the de-
cision by single wage earners to self-select into jobs without insurance. In a more
recent study Monheit and Vistnes (2008), using responses to questions capturing
health insurance preferences, conclude that individuals with weak preferences for
coverage are more likely to be uninsured than those with strong preferences. The
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authors also found that single workers and one-wage-earner couples with weak or un-
certain preferences are less likely than those with strong preferences to obtain offers
of employment-sponsored health insurance and to enroll.
The above referenced literature mainly focuses however on examining the role
of health insurance preferences on enrollment decisions into employment-sponsored
health insurance(ESI). Furthermore, this literature assumes the effects of health insur-
ance preferences to be exogenous in the statistical sense, which in the case of Monheit
and Vistnes (2008) was justified by the fact that responses to the stated preference
measures were obtained independently of survey questions regarding health insurance
status. Therefore the authors concluded that all concerns of self selection bias were
fully mitigated.
The goal is to understand how stated preferences for health insurance by adults in
the U.S. affect their choices among the three health insurance enrollment categories
(Any private, Public only, Uninsured), and the contribution of this chapter method-
ological in essence. The exogeneity assumption made by previous authors is relaxed,
and a model of health insurance choice is considered, with the stated health insurance
preference variable treated as being endogenously determined in the health insurance
choice model. The parameters associated with this endogeneity are estimated using
the Fully Gibbsian Bayesian Multinomial probit framework by Burgette and Nord-
heim (2009). The procedure makes use of the data augmentation principle by Albert
and Chib (1993), and the partial marginalization principle of van Dyk (2010).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II describes the empirical model of
enrollment decision. Section III provides an exposition of the analytical strategy.
Section IV presents the full Gibbs Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampler for the pa-
rameters in the model. Section V describes the data, while results are presented in
section VI, and section VII concludes the analysis.
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4.2 Empirical Model of Enrollment Decisions
The premise underlying the modeling strategy implemented lends itself to the dis-
crete choice framework derived under the assumption of utility maximizing behavior
by the agents. Individuals are assumed to be rational and to make health insurance
enrollment decisions on the basis of a vector of demographic characteristics (Age, Sex,
Marital status, Education level) given their needs/general health conditions captured
by the dummies (Excellent, Vergood, Good, and Fairpoor) and enabling factors (Fam-
ily and personal income, health insurance preference). Although many factors affect
this choice process, the contention in this paper is that health insurance preference
is a major determinant of the enrollment decision. The general set up of the decision
process can be described as follows:
An adult respondent in the MEPS indexed by n faces a choice among m health
insurance enrollment alternatives, each providing a given level of utility. The latent
utility derived from the choice of alternative j is Lnj, for j = 1, . . . ,m, and is only
known to the individual respondent. This utility is decomposed as Lnj = Vnj + nj,
where nj captures unobserved factors affecting utility, and not included in the ob-
served part Vnj of utility. The individual chooses to enroll in the health insurance
category yielding the greatest utility, therefore the behavioral model consists of choos-
ing enrollment alternative i if and only if Lni > Lnj for all j 6= i. The probability
that respondent n chooses alternative i is given as:
Pni = Prob(Lni > Lnj ∀ j 6= i) (4.1)
= Prob(Vni + ni > Vnj + nj ∀ j 6= i) (4.2)
= Prob(nj − ni < Vni − Vnj ∀ j 6= i) (4.3)
=
∫

I(nj − ni < Vni − Vnj j 6= i)f(n)dn , (4.4)
This choice probability is expressed as a cumulative distribution function of the
error differences with an (m− 1) dimensional density function f(n). I(·) represents
84
the indicator function, taking a value of 1 when the expression in parentheses is true
and 0 otherwise. Probit specification of this choice probability jointly models the un-
observed utility components using the normal density, such that f(n), is multivariate
normal.
Endogeneity in this probit model is motivated using the following general additive
form representation of the utility function for individual n choosing alternative i:
Lni = f(yni, xn, βn) + ni, (4.5)
where the systematic portion of the utility contains observed exogenous variables, xn,
relating to person n, the endogenous variable (health insurance preference), yni, and
the parameter vector, βn. The endogenous variable yni can be further represented as:
yni = g(zn, γ) + µni, (4.6)
where µni and ni are correlated but independent of the exogenous instruments, zn.
This correlation between the errors µni and ni implies that the health insurance pref-
erence variable is correlated with unobserved factors affecting utility from enrolling
in the various health insurance categories. This characteristic creates the statisti-
cal endogeneity of the stated health insurance preference variable, and leads to bias
using standard estimation methods, which assumes that the distribution of the out-
come variable conditional on the observed regressors has a zero mean. This feature
is however addressed by the fully Gibbsian Bayesian Multinomial probit estimation
procedure implemented in this paper, which allows for correlations between unob-
servables.
4.3 Analytical Strategy
The motivation for this empirical analysis is the desire to model health insurance
choices by adult respondents in the 2007 Medical Expenditure Panel (MEP) Survey.
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In early rounds of the survey respondents state their preferences for health insurance
by expressing its worthiness to them. Individuals either agree that health insurance
is not worth the cost(NW ), or disagree (W ), or are uncertain(UC). Then after the
last round, we observe the coverage choice made by the respondent over the scope
of the panel as either Any Private, Public Only, or Uninsured, conditional on the
stated preference for health insurance. The basic research goal then is to be able
to say, for a set of covariates, how the health insurance outcome probabilities vary
based on differing attitudes toward health insurance cost worthiness (health insurance
preferences).
In order to address this research question, two interdependent processes are mod-
eled. The first process relates to the insurance preference, and the second process
relates to the insurance outcome conditional on the preferences. Because the cate-
gories in both preference and outcome variables are unordered the choice of labeling
is arbitrary, and can be indexed with 0, 1 and 2 respectively, with 0 being the base
category. These base categories are “uncertain” for the preferences and “uninsured”
for the outcomes. Therefore for each individual n, with n = 1, 2, . . . N , we can define
Yn to be the ordered pair of insurance preference and outcome.
The probit framework is used to model both insurance preference and choice out-
come, allowing the errors to be correlated. The model assumes each decision maker
constructs latent utilities for each of the choice options, and chooses the option corre-
sponding to the maximum of the utilities. To make things more explicit, in setting up
our fully Gibbsian Bayesian Multinomial probit framework, we assume the existence of
an 8-dimensional vector Ln that contains the latent utilities associated with insurance
preferences and choice outcomes, relative to the respective base categories. Ln can be
thought of as being blocked into four groups of two, so that Ln = (L
p
′
n ;L
0
′
n , L
1
′
n , L
2
′
n ).
The first block Lp
′
n contains utilities for health insurance preferences/selection process
relative to the base category (uncertain).
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The first element of this block represents the utility associated with choosing
“Agree” over choosing “Uncertain;” while the second element in this block repre-
sents the utility associated with choosing “Disagree” over choosing “Uncertain.” The
remaining blocks relate to the outcomes conditional on the preferences 0, 1 and 2
respectively, relative to the base category (uninsured).
Given any preference choice, whether (0–uncertain, 1–Agree, 2–Disagree), with
0, 1 and 2 indexing each of the remaining blocks, each block contains two relative
utilities. The first one being the utility associated with choosing “some Private”
over being “uninsured,” while the second one represents the utility associated with
choosing “Any Public” over being “uninsured.” If the first two elements of any block
in Ln are both negative, the agent will prefer the base category. Otherwise, the
individual will prefer the category that corresponds to the larger of the first two
elements in that particular block. More formally, the link between Ln and Yn =
(Yn1, Y
′
n2) is given by
Yn1 =

argmaxk ∈ 1,2 L
p
k if maxk ∈ 1,2 L
p
k > 0
0 Otherwise.
Yn2 =

argmaxk ∈ 1,2 L
Yn1
k if maxk ∈ 1,2 L
Yn1
k > 0
0 Otherwise.
Ln is assumed to be linear on observed covariates up to an additive normal dis-
turbance:
Ln = Xnβ + n n = 1, . . . N (4.7)
with Xn representing a matrix of covariates, β a vector of regression parameters, and
 representing the vector of disturbances assumed to be iid distributed with mean
zero and covariance matrix Σ. The complete data likelihood obtained if the latent
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utilities were observed is
p(L|β,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−N2 exp
{
−1
2
N∑
n=1
(Ln −Xnβ)Σ−1(Ln −Xnβ)
}
(4.8)
Since the latent utilities Ln are not observed, we have the incomplete data likelihood
obtained by forming expectations over all Ln, with the integrals defined over the
region implied by Yn
p(Y|β,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−N2
N∏
n=1
∫
Yn
exp
{
−1
2
N∑
n=1
(Ln −Xnβ)Σ−1(Ln −Xnβ)
}
dLn (4.9)
For notational convenience, the parameters in the model are defined as θ = (β,Σ).
Assuming further Xn to be block-diagonal, then the model in matrix form can be
represented as:
Ln =
I2 ⊗ z′n 0
0 I6 ⊗ x′n
β + n = Xnβ + n. (4.10)
where Ij is the j × j identity matrix, and ⊗ indicates the Kronecker product. zn is a
vector of exogenous covariates relating to the selection process (stated preferences),
and xn relates to the outcome process (revealed choices). In stacked form, equation
(4.7) can be expressed as L = Xβ + , where L and  are 8N × 1, and X is 8N × p,
while β is p × 1. In this format,  is distributed normally with a zero mean, and
covariance IN ⊗ Σ.
Because the scale of the MNP is undefined, it is customary to set the first diag-
onal element of the covariance matrix Σ to unity in order to achieve identification
(Train, 2009, p.100-103). In the presence of endogeneity this identification issue is
complicated further, requiring additional diagonal elements to be fixed at unity. In
the 3× 3 switching model developed here, four choice models are effectively merged,
so that Σ is 8 × 8 and all of the odd-numbered diagonal elements fixed to one, to
ensure identification. This gives the following structure for Σ
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Figure 4.1: Functional partition of the covariance matrix Σ. the dark square corresponds to
covariances within stated preferences, and the medium gray squares to the covariances in the choice
outcome equations. The light gray rectangles show correlations between stated preference and choice
outcome equations, and the white polygons indicate parameters that are not identified by the data.
Σ =

1 σ12 σ13 σ14 σ15 σ16 σ17 σ18
. σ22 σ23 σ24 σ25 σ26 σ27 σ28
. . 1 σ34 σ35 σ36 σ37 σ18
. . . σ44 σ45 σ46 σ47 σ48
. . . . 1 σ56 σ57 σ58
. . . . . σ66 σ67 σ68
. . . . . . 1 σ78
. . . . . . . σ88

(4.11)
As illustrated in figure (4.1), which shows the functional partition of the vari-
ance covariance matrix Σ, the covariance structure of the selection (stated prefer-
ence) phase is the darkest square. The covariance structures associated with an
outcome choice, conditional on a stated preference, are represented by the medium
gray squares. The light gray rectangles show correlation between selection and out-
come equations, and are similar to the selection parameters in a standard Heckman
selection model (Heckman, 1979)
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4.4 The MCMC Sampler for Model Parameters
Application of Bayesian methods to the probit model was first introduced by Albert
and Chib (1993), and further described by McCulloch et al. (2000). Endogeneity in
the context of probit modeling has also received much attention in the literature, with
Chib and Hamilton (2000) describing a model with multinomial probit selection and
a binary outcome. Li and Tobias (2005) considered a binary selection model with
unordered probit response, Munkin and Trivedi (2008) analyzed an ordered outcome
with discrete endogenous covariates, while Burgette and Nordheim (2009) looked at
a model where both selection and outcome categories are unordered. The modeling
strategy used in this analysis relates closely to the latter, which is an extension of
Imai and van Dyk (2005).
To circumvent the problems associated with the lack of closed form solution for the
multinomial probit model, data augmentation techniques as described by Albert and
Chib (1993) are coupled with MCMC methods. This is accomplished by expanding
the parameter space with latent variables, which in a Bayesian context yields a full
Gibbs sampler with prior specified on the identified model parameters (Burgette and
Nordheim, 2009). In the following the sampler is derived for the case with three
selection categories representing the stated preferences for health insurance, and three
outcome categories representing the revealed health insurance choices.
4.4.1 Prior distributions
A weakly informative prior is specified following recommendations by McCulloch et al.
(2000), who suggest using a weakly informative default prior in the absence of strong
prior information. The specification closely follows that of Imai and van Dyk (2005),
and Burgette and Nordheim (2009). The inverse of the covariance matrix Σ−1 is
partitioned into blocks of 2×2, with Σ−1 = {Σ−1ij } , for i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4. For this model
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the following independent prior is specified:
β ∼ N(β0, B−10 ) and p(Σ) ∝ |Σ|−(v+9)/2
(
4∏
i=1
tr(SiiΣ
−1
ii )
)−v
(4.12)
where the elements σii for i = 1, 3, 5, 7 of the covariance matrix Σ are set to one. β0
and B−10 represent respectively the prior mean and covariance matrix of β. v is the
prior degrees of freedom for the covariance structure, and Sii are the prior scale of
the covariances of the four inherent discrete choice models. The prior specification
for Σ is derived from the inverse-Wishart distribution, which is commonly used as a
conditional conjugate prior in multivariate normal Bayesian analyses.
To obtain the prior for Σ as specified in equation (4.12), we begin with the un-
restricted covariance matrix Σ˜ ∼inv-Wishart(v,S) and transform to (a,Σ), with a =
(σ˜11, σ˜33, σ˜55, σ˜77), and Σ = A
−1Σ˜A−1, whereA−1 = diag(a−0.51 , a
−0.5
2 , a
−0.5
3 , a
−0.5
4 , a
−0.5
5 ,
a−0.56 , a
−0.5
7 , a
−0.5
8 ). This transformation takes us from an unconstrained positive-
definite and symmetric matrix Σ˜, into a constrained covariance structure Σ with
all odd positioned diagonal elements set to one to ensure identification, giving the
following distribution:
p(Σ, a) =
|S|v/2
24vΓ8(v/2)
|Σ|−(v+9)/2 exp{−1/2tr(A−1SA−1Σ−1)} 4∏
i=1
a−v−1i , (4.13)
Integrating the above equation (4.13) with respect to a yields the prior p(Σ) as shown
in equation (4.12). This prior is made weakly informative and proper by choosing v
such that v ≥ 8 following recommendations by McCulloch et al. (2000).
For the prior of the coefficient vector β, implementation of the full Gibbs sampling
scheme requires that we be able to switch between the scale of the restricted covariance
matrix Σ and that of the unrestricted covariance matrix Σ˜.
In the following, parameters with tilde relates to the unrestricted covariance scale,
while those without tilde are defined with respect to the restricted covariance scale.
Since the matrix A is diagonal, and the Xn is block diagonal with only one non-zero
entry per column, pre-multiplying the utility equation by A gives
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ALn = L˜n = AXnβ + An (4.14)
= XnAβ + An (4.15)
= Xnβ˜ + ˜n, (4.16)
where A is the expansion of A to the dimensions implied by β, that is
A = diag(Aii1
′
s, Ajj1
′
o)
′
for i = 1, 2
indexing the diagonal elements of the stated preference (selection) equations, and
j = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 indexing the diagonal elements of the revealed choice (outcome)
equations. Therefore the Aii represent the (i, i)
th entry of A, and 1
′
s and 1
′
o are
vectors of ones with lengths equal to the number of covariates in the selection and
outcome processes respectively. From the priori independence of Σ˜ and β, and the
identity provided in equation (4.14), β˜ = Aβ we get the conditional distribution
β˜|Σ˜ ∼ N(Aβ0,AB−10 A).
4.4.2 Steps of the sampler
Using the equalities
β˜ = Aβ L˜n = ALn, Σ˜ = AΣA, (4.17)
sampling can be done on either the unrestricted unidentified scale with “tilde,” or on
the restricted identified scale with “no tilde.” The sampler goes through the follow-
ing steps, transforming the parameter vector from the unidentified scale, θ˜, to the
identified scale θ between steps 2 and 3 and steps 4 and 1.
1. sample Lnj|(Ln,−j,Σ,β, A) for n = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . , 8, where Ln,−j is
the vector of latent utilities, Ln, with the j
th element removed.
2. Sample (A|Σ,β,L) = (A|Σ) which is Gamma distributed
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• transform to L˜n = ALn
3. sample (β˜|L˜,Σ, A)
• Record β = A−1β˜
4. sample(Σ˜|β˜, L˜)
• Transform Σ˜ to (A,Σ)
• Transform to L = A−1L˜n
The sampler as described uses the partial marginalization principle by van Dyk (2010),
which samples the working parameters (non-zero elements of A) twice per iteration,
while maintaining a stable distribution at each step.
4.4.3 Posterior distribution
Following Burgette and Nordheim (2009), I begin with p(β˜|L˜, Σ˜,Y) = p(β˜|L˜, Σ˜).
Hence, from the density of , L˜, we have
p(β˜|L˜, Σ˜) ∝ exp
{
1
2
∑
n
(
L˜n −Xnβ˜
)′
Σ˜−1
(
L˜n −Xnβ˜
)}
exp
{
1
2
(
β˜ − β˜0
)′
B˜0
(
β˜ − β˜0
)}
(4.18)
which is a multivariate normal distribution with mean
β˜ =
[
B˜0 +
∑
n
X
′
nΣ˜
−1Xn
]−1 [
B˜0β˜0 +
∑
n
XnΣ˜
−1L˜n
]
(4.19)
and covariance
[∑
nX
′
nΣ˜
−1Xn
]−1
.
Next, it can be noted that the posterior distribution of the unrestricted covariance
matrix Σ˜ conditional on the 8-dimensional latent vector of utility L˜ and the unre-
stricted parameters β˜ is inv-Wishart(M˜,N+v) with M˜ =
∑
n
(
L˜n −Xnβ˜
)(
L˜n −Xnβ˜
)′
+
S.
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Finally, the latent vector of utilities Ln is distributed as a truncated multivariate
normal, conditional on (Y, θ), with a mean determined by Xn and β, and a covariance
structure Σ.
4.4.4 Identification of Σ
Recall from figure (4.1) that not all elements of the covariance matrix Σ are identifi-
able. This is because we only observe a single outcome for each respondent, therefore
no information exists in the data to estimate the correlation between potential (but
unobserved) outcomes. Here these unidentified parameters play the same role as
working parameters (Albert and Chib, 1993), as they circumvent direct calculation of
the likelihood function, and improve mixing properties of the Markov Chain, without
affecting the inferential properties of the posterior distribution in so far that a proper
prior is specified over them. To see how, consider the decomposition of the covariance
matrix Σ, into its identifiable part ψ and a vector of unidentifiable part α, therefore
we have p(Y|ψ,β),α) = p(Y|ψ,β), and
p(ψ,β|Y) ∝ p(Y|ψ,β)p(ψ,β) (4.20)
= p(Y|ψ,β)
∫
p(ψ,β),α)dα (4.21)
=
∫
p(Y|ψ,β)p(ψ,β),α)dα (4.22)
=
∫
p(Y|ψ,β),α)p(ψ,β),α)dα, (4.23)
Where the last line corresponds to the Markov chain over the expended parameter
space including α, and suggests that a proper representation of the prior for the
covariance matrix Σ in equation (4.12) will be
p(ψ) ∝
∫
|Σ|−(v+9)/2
(
4∏
i=1
tr(SiiΣ
−1
ii )
)−v
dα, (4.24)
which is the prior representation in equation (4.13) marginalized over the unidentified
parameters α. Because this prior representation is free from the unidentified part of
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the covariance matrix, the effect of the distributional assumption made about the
unidentified parameters is fully contained in this prior.
4.5 Data and Variable Description
The empirical analysis is based upon data from the 2007 Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) full year population characteristics data. The survey is sponsored
by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality(AHRQ), and designed to over-
lap two calendar years with a new Panel of sample households selected each year.
The household component of the MEPS collects data from a subsample of the Na-
tional Health Interview Survey and uses stratified and clustered random sampling
with weights that produce nationally representative estimates for a wide range of
health-related demographic and socioeconomic characteristics for the civilian, non in-
stitutionalized U.S. population. The data from the calendar year 2007 was collected
in rounds 1, 2, and 3 for MEPS panel 12 and rounds 3, 4, and 5 for MEPS panel 11.
The survey includes questions on respondents’ attitudes toward health insurance
and health insurance cost, in a self-administered questionnaire (SAQ) which was ad-
ministrated in round 2 for panel 12 and round 4 for panel 11. Although the 2007
MEPS includes 30964 individuals, interviewed over the 2-year period, the target pop-
ulation for the SAQ only include adults (person age 18 or older) in the civilian non
institutionalized population amounting to 19067 respondents. After accounting for
questionnaire non response, the final sample used in this analysis is comprised of
18035 individuals 18 to 85 that were member of the civilian, non-institutionalized
portion of the U.S. population in 2007. For more information on the MEPS sampling
design, see Ezzati-Rice et al. (2008).
The dependent variable in this study is a factor with three mutually exclusive
and exhaustive categories representing the health insurance coverage indicator “IN-
SURANCE.” It is constructed from INSCOV07 provided in the MEPS dataset which
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has 3 levels (1–Some Private, 2–Public Only, 3–Uninsured). Because we wish to use
“uninsured” as the base category in the estimation, the INSURANCE variable is
constructed as a factor with three levels (0. Uninsured, 1. Some Private, 2.Public
Only).
Of main interest is the role played by health insurance preference,“ATTHICW,”
in this choice process. The variable ,“ATTHICW,” is constructed from the variable
ADINSB42 provided in the MEPS dataset which is a factor with 5 levels (1. Dis-
agree strongly, 2. Disagree somewhat, 3. Uncertain, 4. Agree somewhat, 5. Agree
strongly), relating to the statement: Health insurance is not worth the cost. The
variable is recoded into ATTHICW as a factor of 3 levels (0– Uncertain, 1– Agree,
2–Disagree) by combining the first two and last two categories of ADINSB42. This
new variable is interpreted as (0– Uncertain, 1– Not worthy, 2–worthy) and represents
the stated attitude towards health insurance cost. Since a respondent could interpret
Uncertain as something other than indifference, we can consider the choice options
to be unordered. The remaining covariates include demographic characteristics such
as AGE, SEX, EDUCATION, INCOME; marital status; health characteristics; and
regional dummies. Definitions and summary statistics for the covariates are given in
table (4.1).
4.6 Results
The selection (health insurance preference) and the observed outcome (health insur-
ance coverage) are guided by two separate but inter-related processes. In fact, it
is assumed that personal income (INCOME) influences individuals’ attitude toward
health insurance (health insurance preference), while family income (FAMINC) influ-
ences the likelihood of falling in a given coverage category (health insurance outcome).
As such, FAMINC is used here as a genuine exclusion restriction to ensure more ro-
bust identification of the estimated parameters (Heckman, 2000). This is motivated
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for the independent variables in the model
N = 18035 Mean SD
Demographic characteristics
AGE age of respondent in years 46.160 17.445
SEX = 1 if respondent is female 0.542 0.498
MARRIED = 1 if Currently married 0.562 0.496
COLLEGE = 1 if at least one year of college 0.444 0.497
INCOME Individual’s income in 1000 29.998 31.471
FAMINC Family’s income in 1000 59.942 52.721
FAMSIZ Number of family members 3.045 1.664
Health characteristics
VERGOOD = 1 if very good health 0.334 0.472
GOOD = 1 if good health 0.326 0.469
FAIRPOOR = 1 if fair or poor health 0.165 0.371
Regional dummies
MIDWEST = 1 if respondent is from the Midwest 0.209 0.407
NORTHEAST = 1 if respondent is from the Northeast 0.150 0.357
WEST = 1 if respondent is from the West 0.257 0.437
Variance estimation Var.
VARSTR Variance estimation stratum 534.3 489.89
VARPSU Variance estimation PSU 1.664 0.627
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by the fact that in expressing health insurance preference, adult respondents take
into account subjective/personal information, while the actual observed coverage at
the end of the year is affected by other family members and whether they have health
insurance coverage that can be extended to the respondent.
The R package endogMNP is used to fit the model. Three Markov chains of
length 22000 iterations were run, with the over dispersed default starting values, a
burn-in period of 2000 iterations and a thinning interval of 5 iterations. To assess
convergence of the chains, the coda package in R (Plummer et al., 2006)is used to
compute the Gelman-Rubin convergence diagnostic (Gelman and Rubin, 1992). For
the results presented, the Gelman statistics had values below 1.2 for all 138 estimated
parameters, indicating acceptable convergence of the chains.
Table 4.2 shows the mean and variance of the marginal posterior distribution of
the coefficients corresponding to the selection process. Looking at the coefficients on
SEX, we see that females are less likely than males to express “not-worthy” compared
to “uncertain” as their preference for health insurance (−0.0623), while more likely
than males to express “worthy” compared to “uncertain” (0.675).
The coefficient value 0.0720 for MARRIED suggests that compared to unmarried
adults, currently married individuals are more likely to express “worthy” compared to
“uncertain” as their preference for health insurance. In relation to education, the co-
efficients on COLLEGE (0.0850 and 0.1655) suggest that adults with at least one year
of college experience are more decisive in the expression of their health insurance pref-
erence (worthy or Not-worthy), compared to those with no college experience, whom
tend to be less decisive (uncertain). The coefficients values (0.0034 and 0.0049) for
INCOME suggest that an increase in personal income increases respondents’ deci-
siveness in the expression of their health insurance preference (Not-worthy or Worthy
over Uncertain).
The negative coefficients on the health characteristics dummy variables suggest
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Table 4.2: Posterior means and standard deviations for the β parameters related to
the insurance preference or selection process
Not-Worthy Worthy
(Atthicw=2) (Atthicw=3)
INTERCEPT 0.1906∗∗ 0.2018∗∗
(0.0584)† (0.0540)
AGE 0.0005 0.0076∗∗
( 0.0008) (0.0006)
SEX −0.0623∗∗ 0.0675∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0227)
MARRIED 0.1035 0.0720∗∗
(0.0284) (0.0251)
COLLEGE 0.0850∗∗ 0.1655∗∗
(0.0260) (0.0204)
INCOME 0.0034∗∗ 0.0049∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004)
VERGOOD −0.1063∗∗ −0.0210
( 0.0373) (0.0296)
GOOD −0.2134∗∗ −0.0543
(0.0401) (0.0313)
FAIRPOOR −0.2562∗∗ −0.1139∗∗
(0.0453) (0.0350)
MIDWEST −0.0894∗∗ −0.0235
(0.0341) (0.0270)
NORTHEAST −0.0187 −0.0150
(0.0396) (0.0317)
WEST −0.0987 −0.0695∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0239)
† standard deviation of the parameter’s posterior distribution in parentheses.
∗∗ indicates that zero is excluded from the 95% credible set.
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that adults with EXCELLENT health conditions are more likely to find health in-
surance “Not-worthy” compared to adults with relatively less ideal health conditions
(VERGOOD, GOOD, FAIRPOOR). This suggests that individuals with excellent
health conditions do not find the need for health insurance as much as do those with
very-good, good, or fair and poor health conditions. Finally the coefficients on the
regional dummy variables suggest that relative to southerners, adults from the MID-
WEST are less likely to express “Not-Worthy” compared to “uncertain,” as their
health insurance preference (−0.0894), while those from the WEST are less likely to
express “Worthy” compared to “uncertain” (−0.0695).
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide coefficient estimates related to the outcome conditional
on the preference categories. Table 4.3 summarizes estimates for “Public” coverage,
while table 4.4 presents estimates for “Private” coverage. If adult respondents express
health insurance preference based on the utility derived from such preference, then we
should worry about self-selection bias, if we wish to predict health insurance coverage
across all preferences for a given adult.
The results will be consistent with the presence of self-selection bias in the follow-
ing sense. If modeling the distribution of a given coverage category conditional on
each of the preference category and a set of covariates provides different estimates of
the intercept, then the coverage outcome of interest is partly determined by the type
of health insurance preference the respondent chooses to express. This dependence
of the coverage outcome on the choice of preference by the adult respondent creates
the self-selection bias, when we wish to predict health insurance coverage across all
preferences for a given adult.
Looking at the intercept estimates in table 3.3, adults with weak preferences (Un-
certain and Not-worthy) are less likely to be publicly covered only (−0.8652 and
−0.440) compared to being uninsured, while individuals with strong preference for
health insurance (worthy) are more likely (0.3458) to have public coverage only com-
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Table 4.3: Posterior means and standard deviations for the β parameters related to
choosing public coverage over being uninsured conditional on each stated preference
Public|Uncertain Public|Not-Worthy Public|Worthy
(Insurance=2|Atthicw=1) (Insurance=2|Atthicw=2) (Insurance=2|Atthicw=3)
CONST −0.8652∗∗ −0.440∗∗ 0.3458∗∗
(0.1088)† (0.1342) (0.1166)
AGE 0.0062∗∗ 0.0032 −0.0055
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0028)
SEX 0.1306 0.0708∗∗ 0.0389
(0.0418) (0.0323) (0.0358)
MARRIED 0.0357 0.2145∗∗ 0.3542∗∗
(0.0540) (0.0413) (0.0455)
COLLEGE 0.2234∗∗ 0.2218∗∗ 0.3681∗∗
(0.0524) (0.0443) (0.0383)
FAMINC 0.039∗∗ 0.0064∗∗ 0.0130∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.009)
FAMSIZ −0.0681∗∗ −0.0923∗∗ −0.1883∗∗
(0.168) (0.0130) (0.0125)
VERGOOD 0.1250∗∗ 0.0779 0.0940∗∗
(0.0577) (0.0040) (0.0423)
GOOD 0.0501 0.0465 −0.0239
(0.0544) (0.0386) (0.0390)
FAIRPOOR 0.0474 −0.1186∗∗ −0.3162∗∗
(0.0639) (0.0544) (0.0547)
MIDWEST 0.2244∗∗ 0.2342∗∗ 0.1864∗∗
(0.0561) (0.0473) (0.0475)
NORTHEAST 0.2762∗∗ 0.2133∗∗ 0.0264
(0.0661) (0.0485) (0.0769)
WEST 0.0621 0.0804∗∗ −0.0754
(0.0465) (0.0356) (0.0435)
† standard deviation of the parameter’s posterior distribution in parentheses.
∗∗ indicates that zero is excluded from the 95% credible set.
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pared to being uninsured. These results are consistent with the existence of self-
selection bias as described above. The effect of AGE on public coverage varies by
health insurance preference and is significant only for individuals with “uncertain”
preference. The coefficient value of (0.0062) suggests that an increase in age leads to
increased likelihood of coverage through public insurance only over being uninsured,
for individuals with “uncertain” health insurance preference. Also females with “Not-
worthy” preference are more likely (0.0708) than their male counterparts to have
public coverage only, compared to being uninsured. In addition currently married
adults are more likely than those not currently married to be covered through public
insurance only, over being uninsured. This observation is true for both individuals
with “worthy” and “Not-worthy” preferences (0.3542 and 0.2145 respectively).
The effect of college education on coverage through public only, is significant
across all health insurance preference categories. Although this effect is almost similar
for adults with weak preference (uncertain, and Not-worthy) which are 0.2234 and
0.2218 respectively, it is relatively larger, 0.3681 for individuals with strong preference
for health insurance (worthy). These coefficient values suggest that regardless of
insurance preference, compared to adults with no college experience, those with at
least one year of college experience are more likely to be publicly covered only, over
being uninsured. The positive coefficient estimates for family income (FAMINC)
across all health insurance preference suggests that an increase in family income
increases the likelihood of being only publicly insured over being uninsured. The
negative coefficient estimates however, across all insurance preferences for family size
(FAMSIZ) suggests that an increase in family size decreases the likelihood of coverage
through public only, over being uninsured. This less intuitive result may be explained
by the fact that while increased family size may affect uninsured or private coverage
status, depending on whether or not other family members have coverage that can be
extended to the respondent, family size has no effect on public coverage status which
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is based solely on age and income requirement that must be met by the respondent.
With respect to health characteristics, relative to having an excellent health con-
dition, adults with very good health conditions are more likely to be only publicly
covered over being uninsured, when their preference for health insurance is either
“uncertain” or “Worthy.” On the other hand, relative to having an excellent health
condition, adults with fair or poor health conditions are less likely to be only publicly
covered over being uninsured, when their preference for health insurance is either
“Not-worthy” or “worthy.”
Looking at the regional dummy variables, the positive and significant coefficient
values for MIDWEST across all preference categories suggest that relative to south-
erners, adults from the Midwest are more likely to choose public coverage over be-
ing uninsured irrespective of insurance preference. Similarly, relative to southerners,
adults from the Northeast are more likely to choose public coverage over being unin-
sured, however they only do so when they have weak preference for health insurance
(Uncertain, or Not-Worthy).
Now turning to the estimates for “Private” coverage conditional on all preference
categories as summarized in table 3.4, interpretation is done as in table 3.3. The inter-
cept values of −1.3010 and −1.9300 for adults with weak health insurance preference
(Uncertain and Not-Worthy) suggest that individuals with such preferences are less
likely to have any private coverage relative to being uninsured. On the other hand,
the intercept value of (1.5640) for individuals with strong preference (Worthy) sug-
gest that adults with such preferences are more likely to have some private coverage
relative to being uninsured.
The effect of AGE on private coverage is positive and significant across all health
insurance preference categories. This suggests that an increase in age increases the
probability of having some private coverage over being uninsured, irrespective of
health insurance preference. The positive and significant coefficient values for SEX
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Table 4.4: Posterior means and standard deviations for the β parameters related to
choosing private coverage over being uninsured conditional on all preference levels
Private|Uncertain Private|Not-Worthy Private|Worthy
(Insurance=3|Atthicw=1) (Insurance=3|Atthicw=2) (Insurance=3|Atthicw=3)
INTERCEPT −1.3010∗∗ −1.9300∗∗ 1.5640∗∗
(0.1795)† (0.1760) (0.1571)
AGE 0.0291∗∗ 0.0322∗∗ 0.0216∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0031)
SEX 0.2760∗∗ 0.3710∗∗ 0.0905∗∗
(0.0610) (0.0569) (0.0537)
MARRIED −0.2770∗∗ −0.4103∗∗ −0.3317∗∗
(0.0806) (0.0740) (0.0334)
COLLEGE 0.2028∗∗ −0.1665∗∗ 0.3444∗∗
(0.0855) (0.0613) (0.0312)
FAMINC 0.0095∗∗ 0.0094∗∗ 0.0109∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0006)
FAMSIZ 0.0519∗∗ 0.1061∗∗ 0.1090∗∗
(0.0220) (0.0183) (0.0102)
VERGOOD 0.0035 0.2132∗∗ −0.0072
(0.1147) (0.0754) (0.0551)
GOOD −0.0543 0.4077∗∗ 0.0479
(0.1000) (0.0948) (0.0492)
FAIRPOOR 0.1528 0.7317∗∗ 0.3793∗∗
(0.1202) (0.0964) (0.0601)
MIDWEST 0.2040∗∗ 0.3301∗∗ 0.0139
(0.0951) (0.0829) (0.0643)
NORTHEAST 0.5254∗∗ 0.4031∗∗ 0.3224∗∗
(0.094) (0.0877) (0.1026)
WEST 0.2060∗∗ 0.3005∗∗ 0.2234∗∗
(0.0803) (0.0810) (0.0617)
† standard deviation of the parameter’s posterior distribution in parentheses.
∗∗ indicates that zero is excluded from the 95% credible set.
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across all insurance preference categories suggests that females are more likely than
males to have some private coverage over being uninsured, regardless of health insur-
ance preference. On the other hand, the negative coefficients values for MARRIED
across all preference categories suggest that currently married individuals are less
likely than their unmarried counterpart to have some private coverage compared to
being uninsured.
The direction of the effect of COLLEGE on private coverage varies across insur-
ance preferences. Adults with at least one year of college experience are less likely
than those with none to have some private coverage relative to being uninsured, when
their preference for health insurance is “Not-worthy,” but are more likely when their
health insurance preference is “Uninsured” or “Worthy.” An increase in family income
(FAMINC) increases the likelihood of having some private coverage over being unin-
sured, irrespective of health insurance preference. This effect is relatively stronger
however for individuals with the “worthy” preference. Similarly, an increase in fam-
ily size (FAMSIZ) increases the likelihood of private coverage over being uninsured,
across all insurance preference categories.
Looking at coefficient estimates for the health characteristics variables, we can
say that relative to having an EXCELLENT health condition, adults with GOOD or
VERY-GOOD health conditions are more likely to have some private coverage, but
only when their preference for health insurance is “Not-Worthy.” However, individuals
with FAIR or POOR health condition, relative to adults with EXCELLENT health
condition, are more likely to have some private coverage when they are more decisive
in the expression of their health insurance preference (worthy or Not-worthy).
The coefficient estimates on the regional dummy variables suggest that relative to
southerners, irrespective of health insurance preference, adults from NORTHEAST
and WEST are more likely to have some private coverage over being uninsured. How-
ever, for adult respondents from the MIDWEST this is only true when they have a
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weak preference for health insurance (Uninsured or Not-worthy).
Although all identifiable elements of the variance covariance matrix are estimated,
table 4.5 only summarizes the diagonal elements which correspond to the variances.
All the estimated variance coefficients have related 95 percent posterior intervals not
containing zero, suggesting their significance at the 5 percent level. Estimation of
the variance covariance matrix although not of primary interest, allows the standard
error of the estimated coefficients on the covariates, to reflect the correct variability,
which also includes variability associated with the selection process.
4.7 Conclusion
This essay has concerned itself with modeling health insurance choices by adults in
the U.S., using the 2007 MEPS dataset. More specifically, the basic research goal
was to be able to say, for a set of covariates, how the insurance choice probabilities
vary based on differing attitudes towards health insurance cost worthiness (Health
insurance preference).
The results in fact suggested the existence of self-selection bias as coverage out-
come was found to depend on the choice of health insurance preference made by the
individual respondents. Overall the analysis extended the past literature by capturing
the endogeneity of health insurance preference in the revealed coverage outcome pro-
cess, while providing results consistent with the existing literature. In fact a major
result in the literature is that individuals with weak preference (uncertain or Not-
worthy), are less likely to be insured compared to uninsured, while individuals with
strong preferences (worthy) are more likely to be insured compared to being unin-
sured (Monheit and Vistnes, 2008). The Fully Gibbsian Bayesian Multinomial Probit
framework (Burgette and Nordheim, 2009) implemented in this essay produced simi-
lar findings, but also provided a more accurate measure of the effects of the covariates
by accounting for the self- selection bias.
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Table 4.5: Posterior means, standard deviation and 95 percent credible intervals for
the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix
Estimates L-95 Percent CI U-95 Percent CI
σnw 1.2735 1.2036 1.3430
(0.0330)†
σw 0.7265 0.6566 0.7960
(0.0330)
σpu|u 0.5017 0.3793 0.8000
(0.0901)
σpr|u 1.4983 1.1997 1.6210
(0.0901)
σpu|nw 0.5028 0.3450 0.7880
(0.1061)
σpr|nw 1.4973 1.2120 1.6550
(0.1061)
σpu|w 1.0939 0.7670 1.2330
(0.1107)
σpr|w 0.9062 0.7671 1.2330
(0.1107)
† standard deviation of the parameter’s posterior distribution in parentheses.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
The three essays in this dissertation considered issues associated with risk and decision-
making under uncertainty. In the first essay, uncertainty was modeled analytically
using mathematical tools from microeconomics based on the pioneering work of (Von-
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). The other essays deal with empirical uncertainty
that is modeled within the Bayesian econometric framework.
Specifically the first essay models the risks as experienced by untenured research
faculty. Untenured tenure-track faculty members are given contracts, with up-or-
out rules requiring some quantity and quality quota of research to be met, in order
to gain tenure. The faculty member faces both uncertainty in monetary value of
publication and output uncertainty. This essay extends the analysis of Chen and Lee
(2009) by looking at ex-ante incentive properties of tenure from the perspective of a
junior faculty member, rather than a department as accustomed in the principal-agent
framework. The results suggest that risk significantly affects faculty output.
A risk averse researcher in the presence of price uncertainty, publishes at a point
where the expected value of publication exceeds its marginal cost. Also a faculty mem-
ber’s scientific productivity is shown to be stimulated by increases in base salary when
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) described the faculty member’s preference,
while increased uncertainty in the value of publication provided a lesser incentive for
scientific research output production. Moreover, when publication decision can be
targeted at different journals, risk averse faculty had the economic incentive to target
journals with negatively correlated per-unit returns.
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In the second essay, rationality assumption is put to an empirical test. A ratio-
nal agent expresses an attitude and then takes action that is consistent with that
attitude. The proposition is tested within the context of health insurance choice by
adults in the U.S., using the 2007 MEPS dataset. The evidence from the econometric
estimation supports the notion that agents do act in a way that is consistent with
stated preferences.
The results in this essay are consistent with those found by others, in particu-
lar with respect to individuals’ satisfaction (or optimism) toward health insurance
consumption. The results in fact suggest relatively more skepticism (dissatisfaction)
toward public only coverage compared to having some private coverage. This is be-
cause the strength of unlikeliness to seek health insurance for those that expressed
health insurance to not be worth its cost relative to being uncertain, is stronger for
public only coverage compared to having some private coverage.
Finally, the third essay addressed the issue of health insurance preference endo-
geneity in adults’ health insurance enrollment decision in the U.S. within a Bayesian
multinomial probit framework. The research goal here was to be able to say for a
set of covariates, how the health insurance outcome probabilities vary based on dif-
fering health insurance preferences. The R package endogMNP was used to fit the
model, with the Gelman diagnostic statistics of less than 1.2 for all 138 estimated
parameters, suggesting acceptable convergence of the chains. The sampler used the
marginalization principle of van Dyk (2010), producing marginal posterior distribu-
tions that were easy to interpret. For example it was found that females were less
likely than males to express “not-worthy” compared to “uncertain” as their preference
for health insurance, while more likely than males to express “worthy” compared to
“uncertain.” In addition, the effect of college education on coverage through public
only, is significant across all health insurance preference categories. Although this ef-
fect was almost similar for adults with uncertain, and Not-worthy preferences, 0.2234
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and 0.2218 respectively, it was relatively larger, 0.3681 for individuals with strong
preference for health insurance (worthy). These coefficient values suggested that re-
gardless of insurance preference, compared to adults with no college experience, those
with at least one year of college experience were more likely to be publicly covered
only, over being uninsured. Also, looking at the regional dummy variables, posi-
tive and significant coefficient values across all preference categories suggested that
relative to southerners, adults from the Midwest were more likely to choose public
coverage over being uninsured irrespective of insurance preference. Similarly, relative
to southerners, adults from the Northeast were more likely to choose public coverage
over being uninsured, however they only do so when they have Uncertain, or Not-
Worthy preferences. Finally, the coefficient estimates for the health characteristics
variables suggested that relative to having an EXCELLENT health condition, adults
with GOOD or VERY-GOOD health conditions were more likely to have some pri-
vate coverage, but only when their preference for health insurance is “Not-Worthy.”
However, individuals with FAIR or POOR health conditions, relative to adults with
EXCELLENT health condition, were more likely to have some private coverage when
they are more decisive in the expression of their health insurance preference (worthy
or Not-worthy).
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